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Introduction 
 
This Article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the optimal penalty 
for noncompliance in circumstances in which the tax law is substantively uncertain – that 
is, when the precise application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is 
not clear.  In such situations, two interesting questions arise:  First, as a normative matter, 
how certain should a taxpayer be before she relies on a particular interpretation of a 
substantively uncertain tax rule?  That is, if a particular position is not clearly prohibited, 
but neither is it clearly allowed, under the tax law, what is the appropriate threshold of 
confidence that the taxpayer ought to have before engaging in the transaction?  Second, 
what penalty regime would give the taxpayer the right incentive with respect to relying 
on substantively uncertain tax law? 
To address this and related questions, the Article makes use of the following 
hypothetical:  Joe Taxpayer (who can be thought of either as an individual investor, a 
business-owner, or a manager of a corporation) is trying to decide whether to invest, or 
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have his company invest, in a particular business transaction.  In making this decision, 
Joe takes into account an array of issues, all of which boil down to one obvious question 
– how much money will the transaction make net of costs.  As part of this analysis, Joe 
considers the legal consequences of the investment, including the likelihood that the 
investment might lead to some sort of civil litigation or government enforcement action.  
Joe evaluates these legal risks and then he weighs them against the expected benefits of 
the deal.  Among the legal risks he contemplates are the possible tax consequences of the 
transaction. 
Now I want to focus the analysis on the tax-planning question.  Assume that from 
Joe’s perspective (or that of his company) the investment is worth making only if it 
qualifies for a particular tax treatment.  That is, assume the deal makes sense – its overall 
expected benefits exceed the overall expected costs – only if it qualifies as a “nontaxable 
transaction” or, alternatively, only if it generates a special tax loss or tax credit that can 
be used to offset taxes on other income.  Thus, the after-tax profitability of the deal turns 
on the answer to the tax question.  Now the problem:  Joe’s expert tax advisor tells him 
that, although the special tax treatment he seeks for the transaction is not clearly 
forbidden under the existing tax laws, neither is it clearly legal.  In other words, the law 
in question, at least as applied to Joe’s particular transaction, is uncertain.  What should 
Joe do?  What incentive does society want Joe to have in this situation?  Put differently, 
given this reality that the tax law is often uncertain (in terms of how it will be applied ex 
post by the IRS or courts to particular transactions), what is the optimal degree of tax 
compliance and what is the optimal tax penalty regime?   
2
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As it turns out, the answers depend on a number of factors.  To see this point, let’s 
first simplify the analysis further by assuming that the only thing Joe cares about, with 
respect to tax planning anyway, is the expected value of the sum of the possible back 
taxes (plus interest) and the potential penalty.  Joe, in other words, is a rational actor in 
the traditional economic sense of the term, a true homo economicus.  Or put more 
pejoratively, Joe is Holmes’s quintessential “bad man.”TPF1FPT  Assume further that, not only is 
Joe without a conscience, but he faces no informal external sanctions either, such as 
social norms against tax noncompliance.  Either his friends, neighbors, co-workers, and 
fellow corporate managers are utterly indifferent to Joe’s reputation for paying his taxes, 
or he is indifferent to their opinions.  Given all of these simplifying assumptions, Joe’s 
decision whether to engage in the particular transaction in question, and whether to report 
the transaction on his tax returns in the desired manner, will depend on his ex ante 
assessment of (a) the probability that the particular tax position in question will be 
discovered and scrutinized by the IRS, (b) the probability that, if detected, the position 
would be rejected by the IRS and ultimately a court, and (c) the size of the penalty in the 
event of both detection and rejection.TPF2FPT  Obviously, Joe would not be able to estimate 
these variables with great precision, but presumably he would give it his best shot, or pay 
some tax advisor do so.  And it seems sensible to assume that Joe would invest in 
additional information up to the point at which the marginal cost of the additional 
information equaled the marginal benefit.  Again, assuming there is some residual 
uncertainty even after these investments in information are made, then the question 
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law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”). 
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whether the deal is profitable to Joe will depend on this evaluation of uncertain tax law 
and uncertain tax law enforcement. 
That’s Joe’s perspective.  What about society’s perspective?  What does society 
want Joe to do when the substantive content of the law can only be estimated?TPF3FPT  Start 
with the two obvious and extreme positions.  First, one could hold the view that Joe 
should go through with the transaction in question only if the tax position that makes the 
deal attractive – the tax-deferral or the special tax loss or special tax credit or whatever – 
is certain to be upheld by the IRS and the courts.  That is, he should adopt the particular 
interpretation only if he is certain that Congress intended for the preference to apply to 
the particular type of transaction that he is considering and to the particular class of 
taxpayers of which he is a member.  Alternatively, one could hold the view that, so long 
as the tax position in question is not clearly and indisputably forbidden by the Internal 
Revenue Code, the taxpayer should feel free to go for it even if extraneous evidence, or 
common sense, makes clear that Congress did not have the taxpayer (or his type of 
transaction) in mind for this particular tax benefit.  Obviously, neither of these extreme 
positions is the right answer.   Rather, the right approach will depend on the 
circumstances.  Indeed, this Article contends that, when the substantive tax rules are 
uncertain of meaning (as applied to a taxpayer’s particular situation), the taxpayer should 
                                                 
TP
3
PT There is an inherent difficulty in specifying what the “right thing to do” is in this context.  That is, 
whether one has a consequentialist or deontological conception of ethical behavior, identifying the proper 
course of conduct when the substantive law is uncertain is problematic.  In general, we might be able to 
agree that a taxpayer who is operating under conditions of substantive legal uncertainty ought to (and/or 
should be induced by the law to) take tax positions that are in some sense reasonable – that represent 
neither abuse of the system nor charity to the government.  But specifying what this concept of 
reasonableness entails is not a simple task, and is beyond the scope of this Article, although I will a bit 
more about this question as I go along.  It will come as no surprise that the analysis in this Article is largely 
consequentialist in orientation, and as such it conflates the ethical question (i.e., what ought the taxpayer to 
do, even if she could be certain of going undetected) and the law enforcement question (i.e., what 
incentives ought the law create with respect to taxpayer behavior).  
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(and inevitably will) make his decision based on his, or his legal expert’s, probabilistic 
assessment of what the law actually is – or what a court will say that it is.  I argue further 
that the formal penalties for tax underpayment should incorporate and enforce this 
concept of probabilistic compliance.  Interestingly, as the discussion below explains, the 
existing tax penalties to some extent already take this approach. 
Applying the traditional framework of deterrence theory, which I borrow from the 
tax policy and law-and-economics literatures, the Article reaches a number of novel 
conclusions regarding optimal level of tax compliance and the optimal tax-compliance 
penalties when the substantive tax law is uncertain.   
One: The optimal level of legal certitude that a taxpayer should have 
before claiming a substantively uncertain tax benefit will, under a number of assumptions 
to be specified below, depend on (a) the amount of tax benefit at stake in the particular 
investment, (b) the size of the potential pre-tax profit from the investment, and (c) the 
taxpayer’s attitude towards risk. 
Two:  If we assume there is no “detection uncertainty” (that is, if we 
assume that any legal violation will be detected with certainty), a simple rule of strict 
liability for back-taxes plus interest with no additional, punitive penalty produces optimal 
ex ante tax compliance incentives. 
Three:  If we assume (a) that there is some detection uncertainty (that is, a 
positive-but-less-than-one probability of detection), (b) that there is no upper limit on the 
amount of the potential ex post penalty that can be imposed on taxpayers who underpay, 
and (c) that the ex post law-enforcer, either the IRS or court, can accurately determine the 
ex ante probability of detection for the particular activity in question, then a strict liability 
rule with a punitive “kicker” achieves optimal ex ante tax-compliance incentives when 
there is substantive legal uncertainty. 
Four:  If we assume that taxpayers are risk averse, some form of tax 
insurance could be used to convert the risk of a large ex post tax liability to a certain 
payment of the taxpayer’s expected tax liability. 
Given these conclusions, another interesting question arises.  Under what 
circumstances might a fault-based tax penalty regime be a superior, or least a plausible, 
alternative to a strict liability regime?  What exactly should the fault-standard look like?  
5
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How would it be applied by the ex post adjudicator, whether that role is filled by the IRS 
or a court?  What makes these questions especially interesting is that the current tax 
penalty system in the U.S. for the federal income taxes is a fault-based regime and not a 
strict liability regime.  That is, although the Internal Revenue Code obviously applies a 
strict liability standard for the underpaid taxes and interest (i.e., the taxpayer owes 
whatever the courts determine the Code says she owes), but tax penalties under the Code 
are determined on the basis of a fault-based standard.  Under current rules, taxpayers can 
avoid penalties if they can show that they have met what amounts to a reasonableness 
standard.  With respect to the fault-based approach to income tax penalties, the Article 
reaches the following conclusions: 
One: If we maintain all of the traditional assumptions of classical economic 
analysis, and we assume that there is no upper limit on the size of potential ex post fines 
for tax avoidance, a fault-based tax penalty is inferior to a strict liability approach, for 
three reasons:  1) the fault-based regime is more difficult to administer; 2) it encourages 
taxpayers to over-invest, or invest too often, in legally uncertain tax positions; and 3) the 
fault-based regime fails to achieve the same degree of rough distributive justice that the 
strict-liability approach does (with tax insurance). 
Two:  If, however, we relax some of the traditional economic assumptions (e.g., 
perfect rationality and the absence of informal social sanctions), and if we assume that 
there are upper limits on the amount of tax penalties that society can reasonably impose, a 
case can be made for using a fault-based tax penalty regime not entirely different from 
the one that is currently in force. 
Part I of the Article explains the primary sources of uncertainty in the income tax 
laws.  Part II operationalizes the concept of substantive tax law uncertainty by adopting a 
probabilistic understanding of substantive law and by describing what I call the “tax 
compliance continuum.”  Part III adopts the assumption of “detection certainty” (i.e., that 
every tax position gets scrutinized by the IRS) and demonstrates the deterrence benefits 
of a strict liability tax penalty regime, especially in terms of its ability to induce taxpayers 
to behave optimally with respect to ex ante legal uncertainty.  Part IV introduces the 
6
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problem of “detection uncertainty” (known in the tax context colloquially as the “audit 
lottery”) and shows how, under certain assumptions, the classic Bentham-Becker punitive 
penalty can induce taxpayers to internalize the expected tax liability associated with 
substantively uncertain tax positions.  Part V explores the role that tax transaction 
liability insurance, whether privately or publicly provided, could play in such a strict 
liability tax-penalty regime with a punitive Bentham-Becker penalty.  Part VI explains (a) 
why, under traditional deterrence assumptions and assuming a fully deterring Bentham-
Becker penalty, a fault-based tax-penalty regime is inferior to a strict liability regime but 
(b) why, assuming the Bentham-Becker penalty is unrealistic, a fault-based regime might 
be second-best optimal. 
I.  Sources of Tax Law Uncertainty 
Before the analysis can get under way, an initial question is why there is 
substantive tax law uncertainty in the first place.  Those with only a passing familiarity 
with the U.S. tax laws might question the plausibility of the claim that the tax law is rife 
with uncertainty.  After all, the U.S. federal income tax system is among the most 
detailed and comprehensive legal regimes in the world.  Given the thousands of pages of 
Internal Revenue Code and umpteen-thousands of pages of Treasury Regulations,TPF4FPT the 
non-expert might be tempted to conclude that precise tax treatment of every conceivable 
transaction should be gleanable from the existing tax laws, so long as one has the time to 
read and the expertise to understand the Code or has the resources to hire someone else to 
do it.  Everyone realizes, of course, that the Code is inscrutable to the common man, but 
surely the tax cognoscenti, whose opinions can be gotten for a price, can find the answers 
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4
PT The full text of Title 26 of the United States Code is 3,387 pages long.  According to the US Government 
Printing Office, there are 13,458 pages of federal regulations devoted to interpreting that tax laws.  
HTUhttp://www.trygve.com/taxcode.htmlUTH  
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in all of those pages.  For two general reasons, however, there is, and likely will always 
be, considerable uncertainty in the tax laws.  The first has to do with the complexity of 
the laws.  The second has to do with unintended gaps or loopholes in the law. 
By most accounts, the U.S. federal income tax is the paradigmatic system of rules 
rather than standards.TPF5FPT  A taxpayer’s tax liability is determined by applying a precise rate 
schedule to a particular number, which is that taxpayer’s taxable income.  Sounds simple 
enough.  However, as already mentioned, the number of words in the Internal Revenue 
Code that must be consulted to determine one’s income tax liability is staggering.  And 
the level of specificity and hence the complexity with which the Code defines terms and 
explains procedures is legendary.  Some of this complexity results from Congress’s 
habitual attempts to enact social policy into the tax code, whether it be to subsidize a 
particular form of investment (such as research and development) or a particular class of 
taxpayers (such as families or the poor).  Another source of complexity is the attempts by 
Congress and the Treasury Department to close unintended loopholes in the tax laws, 
discovered further below.  Whatever the source, the complexity of the tax rules is a 
primary source of substantive legal uncertainty.   This sort of uncertainty is the primary 
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5
PT David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 860 (1999) (“The tax law is the 
paradigmatic system of rules.”).  According to conventional legal theory, the distinction between rules and 
standards turns on the degree of ex ante versus ex post specification of the content of the legal norm in 
question.  That is, a rule in this taxonomy is a legal norm whose application to particular situations is 
precisely and thoroughly specified in advance of the occurrence of the regulated activity in question.  With 
a rule, then, the role of the ex post adjudicator, the agency or court or whoever, is merely to determine what 
the facts are and which rule is applicable.  By contrast, a standard leaves the contents of the legal norm 
vague such that the ex post adjudicator has greater flexibility, and greater responsibility, in deciding what 
the precise content of the legal norm is and how to apply it to particular situations after they arise.  
According to the rules-standards literature, a rule makes sense when (a) the precise application of the legal 
norm to particular situations is relatively easy to define or identify in advance and (b) when the rule is 
expected to be applied with great frequency.  By contrast, a standard may be preferred when an ex ante 
determination of the optimal conduct is relatively difficult and when the norm in question will be applied 
by the ex post adjudicator relatively infrequently.  Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 562 (1992). 
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reason that so many individual taxpayers either have their returns prepared by 
professionals or rely on computer programs such as Turbotax for assistance.  Every year, 
as the tax code increases in length and complexity, more taxpayers find it useful to seek 
expert help to reduce the uncertainty associated with filing their returns.TPF6FPT  And 
complexity-induced uncertainty is a problem that plagues not only unsophisticated 
individuals but also wealthy individuals and large corporations, who can afford expert 
legal advice. 
A second source of substantive legal uncertainty in the tax law is somewhat less 
familiar to non-experts, although it is well known among tax lawyers and accountants, 
and even beginning tax students.  Although there are obvious reasons to have numerous 
detailed tax rules (for example, to set out clearly the tax treatment of the most frequent 
types of transactions), there is simply no way for Congress or the Treasury Department to 
anticipate every contingency and provide in advance the precise tax treatment of every 
conceivable transaction or investment.TPF7FPT  The world is just too complex.  And even if it 
were conceivable to “fully specify” the tax code in this extreme sense, doing so would be 
unreasonable.  At some point the increased degree of ex ante precision in the law is 
outweighed by the cost of figuring out such details in advance and by the loss of 
flexibility that accompanies ex ante rulemaking.  This is the source of the unintended 
loopholes mentioned above.TPF8FPT 
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6
PT Eric Toder, Changes In Tax Preparation Methods, 1993-2003, Tax Notes, May 9, 2005. 
TP
7
PT Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 811 (1983) (“The basic reason why 
statutes are so ambiguous in application is not that they are poorly drafted – though many are – and not that 
the legislators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute – though often they do 
fail – but that a statute is necessarily drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation of the problems 
that will be encountered in, its application.”), citing Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 
30-31 (1949.) 
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8
PT An intentional loophole is different.  Although for some that term might be oxymoronic (that is, some 
consider the term loophole to entail a lack of intentionality on the part of the lawmaker), it is also possible 
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What makes the unintended-loophole problem worse is that taxpayers, at least 
those who have access to sophisticated legal advice, have a strong incentive to find (some 
would say, to create where none exists) these loopholes and exploit them to their 
advantage.  And once a loophole is found to work for one taxpayer, there is a natural 
tendency for others to use it as well.  Thus, what starts as a small gap in the tax laws can 
under the right conditions become a yawning chasm, and the ultimate result can be both 
inefficiency (because taxpayers alter their investment decisions in the effort to minimize 
their taxes) and mal-distribution of resources (because the ability to exploit tax loopholes 
is not evenly or otherwise fairly distributed across taxpayers).TPF9FPT  When this process of 
unintended-loophole discovery and exploitation occurs, it is a virtual necessity that the 
IRS and the courts be empowered to apply some general anti-abuse “gap filler,” some 
statutory interpretive standard (in the rules-standards sense of standard) that limits these 
opportunities.  Examples of these anti-avoidance standards in tax law would be the 
economic substance and sham transaction doctrines.  The use of such anti-avoidance 
standards, however, comes at a cost to the system.  That is, the use of ex post anti-
avoidance standards increases ex ante substantive legal uncertainty, as taxpayers cannot 
know for sure in advance where the Service or a court will draw the economic substance 
or sham transaction line after the fact – just as a driver cannot know for certain where the 
negligent-driver line will be drawn.  But again, the uncertainty created by the existence of 
anti-avoidance doctrines is in general a good thing, when compared with the alternative 
of allowing taxpayers to exploit all unintended loopholes with absolute impunity. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to conceive of an intended tax loophole.  Thus, it is common to hear people use the term loophole in this 
way to describe provisions in the tax laws designed to subsidize certain activities. 
TP
9
PT Weisbach, supra note __, at 868. 
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One conclusion that follows from the preceding discussion is that some level of 
substantive tax-law uncertainty is inevitable.  Which is not to say, of course, that 
Congress and Treasury have no control over the amount, degree, or type of legal 
uncertainty that exists.  Obviously they do.  They can invest more or less time in 
specifying the rules in advance, more or less effort in avoiding unnecessary and 
confusing complexity.  Indeed, there is a large political science literature that explores the 
question why and under what circumstances legislatures would intentionally write vague 
or ambiguous statutes, whether it be a desire to shift the responsibility of unpopular 
decisions to enforcement agencies or to courtsTPF10FPT or the inability to reach a stable 
legislative consensus on legislative language.TPF11FPT  Moreover, in the tax context in 
particular, it is possible to conceive of Congress, perhaps with the cooperation of the 
Treasury Department, actually using the level of legal uncertainty as another tool in their 
tax enforcement toolbox.  That is, if taxpayers are thought to be risk averse, it is not 
difficult to imagine how strategically increasing tax-law uncertainty, and hence the 
variance of possible tax outcomes, in some contexts could serve the same function as 
increasing noncompliance penalties directly.TPF12FPT  Having said all of that, however, in this 
Article I focus on legal uncertainty that is unavoidable by lawmakers.  Therefore, for 
most of the Article, I assume that the choice of the appropriate tax penalty and tax 
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10
PT Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. 
POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through 
Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 104 
(2000); and Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do 
We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 361–66 (1993); Peter H. Aranson 
et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–62 (1982); and Morris P. Fiorina, 
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. 
CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982). 
TP
11
PT See, e.g., David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 432 
(2002). 
TP
12
PT This possibility was formally demonstrated in Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax 
Enforcement, 38 J. Pub. Econ. 17 (1989). 
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liability rule should ignore the effects of the penalty and rule on Congress’s decision to 
increase or decrease the certainty of the laws.   
 
II.  A Conception of Uncertain (or Probabilistic) Tax Law:  the Tax Compliance 
Continuum 
The next step in the analysis is to provide some functional content to the idea of 
substantive legal uncertainty.  Uncertainty itself is a vague term.  Thus, what I mean by 
legal uncertainty is itself unclear.  It could mean this:  the law is so vague that I haven’t a 
clue what it purports to prohibit or allow.  Beats the heck out of me.  Furthermore, the 
law is so uncertain that I cannot even begin to predict how a court would interpret it, at 
least not as applied to the facts of my case.  Some laws may elicit such an extreme 
reaction.  The analysis of this Article, however, will not provide much help in addressing 
that sort of profound legal uncertainty.  Rather, it will focus on situations in which the 
law is uncertain, but educated guesses can be made about what the law means and how it 
will be applied to a given situation.   
One way to operationalize this idea is to array the possible range of tax positions 
(or interpretations of the tax laws) along a continuum according to their probability of 
success on the merits assuming they are reviewed by a court – that is, assuming the 
position will be reviewed by a court and the uncertainty will be resolved.TPF13FPT   On one 
extreme end of this continuum lie tax positions that are indisputably illegal.  The 
probability that the IRS and a court would uphold such positions if asked to do so is zero.  
Taking such a position on one’s tax return would accurately be characterized as outright 
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13
PT Thus, one way of resolving the problem of substantive legal uncertainty is to engage in what Michael 
Abramawicz calls “predictive decisionmaking.”  Michael Abramowicz, Precitive Decisionmaking, 90 Va. 
L. Rev. 69 (2006). 
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tax evasion.  Indeed, I think that’s what people usually mean when they say tax evasion.  
On the other end of the continuum are tax positions that are clearly legal, in the sense that 
the probability that the IRS and the courts would sustain them on the merits (if presented 
with the question) is equal to one.  In between these two extreme points are an infinite 
number of possible tax positions with varying ex ante probabilities of success on the 
merits.  Figure 1 captures the idea of this tax compliance continuum.     
 
What is useful about this continuum is that not only do the two endpoints illustrate the 
most extreme positions, but the continuum allows a whole range of tax positions to be 
graded on the basis of their relative “aggressiveness” according to their relative position 
on the continuum.  Thus, as we move from right to left along the continuum in Figure 1, 
the various tax positions represented by the continuum are becoming increasingly 
aggressive, in the sense that their probability of being rejected on the merits by court if 
detected increases.TPF14FPT 
It is easy to conceive of tax positions that would fall on either end of this 
continuum.  On the clearly illegal side are those taxpayers who simply decline to report 
cash income or intentionally take deductions for expenses that were never incurred.  
                                                 
TP
14
PT It is possible that substantive legal uncertainty in many areas of law might usefully be understood in 
terms of this legal uncertainty continuum.  In this Article, I focus exclusively on substantive uncertainty in 
the tax laws. 
Clearly 
Illegal 
Clearly 
Legal 
Figure 1 
 
Measuring Substantive Legal Uncertainty 
Probability of Winning on the Merits 
   0.1    0.2    0.3  0.4    0.5  0.6    0.7  0.8    0.9
0 1.0
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Everyone would agree that such behavior constitutes obvious illegal tax evasion.  
Obvious tax evasion might also include simply hiding income in illegal foreign accounts.  
Given the zero or near-zero probability that such positions would be upheld on the merits 
if detected, the only motivation for taking them is the hope of going undetected.   On the 
other end of the spectrum, there are many tax positions that are clearly legal:  a simple 
business expense deduction or the exclusion of an item this is clearly a gift.  There is little 
dispute that the tax treatment of many transactions is clear and that the answer to many 
particular tax questions can be known with a high degree of certainty. 
What is more interesting, and what I focus on here, are the many tax positions that 
fall between zero and one in terms of probability of success on the merits.  As any tax 
practitioner or any student in the introductory federal income tax class can tell you, that is 
the area on the continuum where almost all of the interesting tax questions fall.   That is 
where the action is, whether the issue is corporate, partnership, or individual income 
taxation.  In fact, a reasonable case can be made that the vast majority of the tax issues 
that end up being decided by a court had, at the time the transaction was planned and 
carried out, a positive-but-less-than-one probability of success on the merits.  Even the 
most infamous tax-shelter cases, the largely extinct 1970s real-estate-limited-partnership 
kind as well as the more recent corporate-shelter variety, would doubtless fall somewhere 
to the right of “clearly illegal” on the continuum.  Of course, for most tax-shelter 
transactions, there would be disagreement about exactly where on the continuum the 
various shelter transactions fall.  But for almost all of them, one could at least imagine 
using something like the continuum above to assess the relative aggressiveness of the 
taxpayers’ positions.   
14
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Conceiving of the tax compliance decision in such probabilistic, predictive terms 
will often not comport with reality.  Although we may be accustomed to viewing some 
taxpayers as quintessential rational actors (I have in mind those taxpayers who spend a 
great deal of time and money to find loopholes in the law), it is quite a different matter to 
imagine the average individual taxpayer making a probabilistic calculation to determine 
what the substantive tax law in fact is.   And hence this analysis may not apply to the 
average taxpayer filing out his or her 1040EZ.  However, at least for sophisticated 
taxpayers, by which again I mean taxpayers with sufficient resources and incentives to 
hire expert legal advisors, such probabilistic estimates are a part of the game.TPF15FPT  In fact, 
the tax code and regulations make the application of tax penalties for noncompliance 
depend on such probabilistic predictive assessments.  In that sense, the existing tax 
penalty structure already incorporates something like the tax compliance continuum 
described above.  That is to say, if the Service and the courts determine after the fact that 
a particular position taken by a taxpayer is wrong — and thus that the taxpayer owes 
additional taxes — then, the determination of whether the taxpayer must pay additional 
penalties depends on the Service’s (and, if the case winds up in court, the court’s) ex post 
assessment of the taxpayer’s ex ante probability of success on the merits. 
To get a sense of what this probabilistic predictive analysis of the meaning of an 
uncertain legal rule might look like, consider an example of a current tax compliance 
penalty provision.  Under existing law, if a taxpayer understates her tax liability (that is, 
                                                 
TP
15
PT I do not mean to suggest that there is a large class of taxpayers who are constantly doing probability 
calculations to determine what the law is with regard to every tax provision.  However, with respect to the 
tax law provisions (a) that are uncertain in application and (b) that can have a significant effect on tax 
liabilities, many sophisticated taxpayers in fact do such probabilistic calculations — assessing what the 
Service and a court will likely say the law is — either explicitly or implicitly.  And this sort of rational 
cost-benefit calculation with respect to uncertain tax provisions may be very widespread, insofar as even 
many individual taxpayers rely on professional tax return preparers, who are presumably incentivized to 
consider the probabilities of various legal outcomes. 
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the IRS and courts determine that she took a tax position that was impermissible), she 
will generally have to pay, in addition to the back taxes and interest, a penalty of 20 
percent of the understated tax unless she can persuade the IRS or a court ex post that the 
position in question ex ante had approximately a 40 percent chance or better of prevailing 
on the merits assuming the issue were reviewed by a court.  Such uncertain legal 
positions are said to have “substantial authority.” TPF16FPT    Thus, the current taxpayer penalty 
regime for tax underpayments incorporates a version of the sort of probabilistic predictive 
assessment that I describe above; and implicit in the whole analysis is the assumption that 
the substantive tax law itself is uncertain.  This definition of substantial authority is not 
the only example probabilistically assessed tax penalties.  Tax penalties can also be 
avoided if the taxpayer can show that (a) the tax position at issue was disclosed to the 
IRS , and (b) the position had a “reasonable basis” in the law, and reasonable basis here is 
understood to mean roughly a 20 percent chance of prevailing on the merits (again, 
assuming detection).  Thus, if you bring your uncertain tax position to the IRS’s 
                                                 
TP
16
PT More precisely, the 20 percent substantial understatement penalty will be assessed unless the taxpayer 
can demonstrate ex post that she ex ante had “substantial authority” for the position.  I.R.C. 
§ 6662(d)(2)(B).  The official meaning of “substantial authority” found in the Treasury Regulations is 
maddeningly circular.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (“There is substantial authority for the tax treatment of 
an item only if the weight of authority supporting such treatment is substantial with respect to the weight of 
authority supporting contrary treatment.”)   The concept of substantial authority is further defined, 
however, with reference to where it falls on something like the tax compliance continuum in the text above.  
Thus, substantial authority is understand as an objective test that is “less stringent than the ‘more likely 
than not’ standard (which is met if there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the position will be 
upheld) and more stringent than the ‘reasonable basis’ standard,’”.”  Id.  These latter two standards are 
discussed further in the text immediately below.  The actual 40 percent figure is found nowhere in the Code 
or regulations but often gets tossed around by practitioners and commentators as rough statistical 
approximation of the idea.  See, e.g., Comparison of Join Committee Staff and Treasury Recommendations 
Relating to Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, JCX 79-99 (Nov. 15, 1999) , 
p.13, available online at HTUhttp://www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdfUTH.  
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attention, you are allowed to be somewhat more aggressive, in the sense of taking a 
position that is a little further to the left on the tax compliance continuum.TPF17FPT  
And there are other examples of the probabilistic reasoning of this sort in the area 
of tax enforcement.  For certain categories of transactions that the IRS has reason to 
believe are of questionable legitimacy, because of the nature of the transactions or 
because of the IRS’s experience with similar transactions in the past, special rules apply.  
For example, these transactions must be reported to the IRS; hence the term “reportable” 
transactions.TPF18FPT  In addition, to avoid underpayment penalties for such transactions, the 
taxpayer must be able to show not only that the tax position in question in fact had 
substantial authority (as defined above) but also that the taxpayer herself reasonably 
believed the position was “more likely than not” correct.  That is, she must have 
reasonably had the view that the position, in effect, would fall to the right of the mid-
point on the tax compliance continuum of Figure 1. TPF19FPT  As if all these probabilistic 
standards were not enough, there are also the rules governing tax-preparer penalties.  
Thus, a tax preparer herself can be penalized for signing a return, or endorsing a tax 
position, that does not have at least a “realistic possibility of success” standard, which is 
                                                 
TP
17
PT This lower standard, or willingness to waive penalties for relatively aggressive tax positions that are 
disclosed, does not apply to so-called “tax shelters,” defined here as “(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) 
any investment plan or arrangement, or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such 
partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”  I.R.C. 
§ 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).  Thus, if your transaction can be characterized as a tax shelter, even if you disclose it 
to the Service, you incur risk penalties for substantial tax understatements unless you can show that the 
position had at least a 40 percent chance of winning on the merits.  There is also a general exception to any 
substantial understatement penalty if the taxpayer can demonstrate that she had “reasonable cause” for and 
acted in “good faith” with respect to the position in question.  I.R.C. 6664(d).  I will have more to say about 
this “reasonableness” exception below.  
TP
18
PT Reportable transactions include, for example, “listed transactions” (which are specific tax avoidance 
transactions that have been publicly identified by the Service for special scrutiny), “confidential 
transactions” (which are done under conditions in which the tax advisor has insisted on some sort of 
confidentiality agreement), transactions that involve “contractual protection” (where the taxpayer has right 
to a full or partial refund of the tax advisor’s fees if the position is not sustained).  Treas.  Reg.  § 1.6011-
4(b). 
TP
19
PT I.R.C. 6664(d).   
17
Logue:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
Discussion Draft 19
sometimes quantified to mean at least a 33 percent chance of winning on the merits, 
assuming detection.TPF20FPT  Alternatively, if the position in question is disclosed to the 
Service, the preparer can still sign the return and avoid penalties so long as the position is 
a least not “frivolous,”  which some have quantified as something greater than a 10 
percent chance of winning on the merits.TPF21FPT  Taxpayers themselves also are subject to 
special penalties for filing frivolous returns, and an even greater penalty (again) for 
taking positions that are clearly illegal.  
If one wanted to array all of these various points along the relative continuum of 
uncertain tax positions, it would look like this: 
 
 
 
                                                 
TP
20
PT Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c). 
TP
21
PT cites 
Clearly 
Illegal 
Figure 2 
 
Measuring Substantive Legal Uncertainty 
               0.1         0.2         0.3        0.4         0.5        0.6         0.7        0.8         0.9         
Clearly
Legal 
“Not Frivolous”
“Reasonable Basis”
“Realistic Possibility of Success”
“Substantial Authority”
“More Likely than Not”
Probability of Winning on the Merits0 1.0 
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The point is that all of these various penalties depend not on whether the 
particular tax position at issue is legal or illegal, but on the position’s ex ante probability 
of being legal or illegal as determined either by the IRS, a court, or the taxpayer herself.  
Later in the Article, I will return to the question whether the above-described penalty 
scheme, or some modified version of it, can be justified on deterrence grounds.  But first 
let us consider the logically prior questions mentioned in the introduction:  what is the 
socially optimal ex ante probability-of-winning-on-the-merits threshold that taxpayers 
ought to apply in making tax planning decisions?  And what tax penalty regime creates 
the incentives most likely to achieve that result?    
 
III.  Strict Tax Liability and the Optimal Merits Probability Threshold 
To begin to answer these questions, consider again our friend, Joe Taxpayer.  (Or 
maybe we should call him “Sophisticated Joe,” to capture the idea that either Joe himself 
or his advisor is both rational with respect to and informed of the relevant law, or lack 
thereof.)   This time, however, we need to include more of the details of the choice Joe 
faces.  Imagine he is considering a single transaction or investment that will (with 
certainty) produce a pre-tax profit of $75.  Now assume further that there are two and 
only two possible tax treatments of that transaction:  Either it will produce a tax liability 
of $100 or it will produce no tax liability at all.TPF22FPT  Thus, the overall profitability of the 
transaction depends on the ultimate tax consequences; it either produces an after-tax gain 
of $75 or an after-tax loss of $25.TPF23FPT   The problem, of course, is that Joe does not know 
                                                 
TP
22
PT All of the numbers as assumed to be discounted to present value. 
TP
23
PT In effect, I am assuming that even if the transaction has an expected after-tax profit of only one cent, it 
will be enough to induce Taxpayer to invest.  This is obviously an unrealistic assumption, but is useful for 
purposes of simplicity and does not detract from the overall point of the analysis. 
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with certainty what the tax consequences will be.  This is one of those transactions for 
which neither Congress nor the Treasury Department has clearly specified the tax 
treatment.  Hence, the best that Joe can do is estimate, or have his lawyer or accountant 
estimate, the probability that the zero-tax interpretation of the transaction will be upheld 
if detected and then make his investment decision accordingly. 
Let us also assume that the tax-law uncertainty that Joes faces will be resolved 
only after he has made the investment and only after several years – however long it takes 
for the IRS to select Joe’s return for audit and either reject or accept the tax position in 
question, or for the statute of limitations on that return year to run.  What this assumption 
implies also is that Joe cannot, at a reasonable cost or within a reasonable time, get a 
private letter ruling to resolve the uncertainty before the investment is made.  Assume 
also that, once the transaction is entered into, it cannot reasonably be unwound or 
reversed should the tax treatment on which the taxpayer relies happen to be struck down.  
That is, there are no “do-overs.”  Rather, in the event the tax position turns out to be 
wrong, Taxpayer simply has to absorb the extra taxes and penalties, which in this case 
would again mean that the transaction, from an ex post perspective, would be a net after-
tax loser.  Relatedly, I assume initially that it is impossible to purchase private insurance 
against the possibility of an adverse tax decision and, in any event, that Taxpayer is risk 
neutral (in the sense of being indifferent between two prospects with differing levels of 
variance but equal expected values).  I relax these assumptions below. TPF24FPT 
Finally, begging the reader’s indulgence, a few additional assumptions are 
necessary for the analysis to proceed, and these are assumptions that are common to the 
                                                 
TP
24
PT The other assumption that is essential to this deterrence analysis is that Taxpayer has sufficient assets to 
pay whatever tax penalty is assess ex post – that is, Taxpayer is not “judgment proof.” 
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economic analysis of law.  The particular implications of these assumptions will be 
explored later in the Article.  First, recall the assumptions from the introduction that the 
taxpayer is a rational actor in the traditional sense and cares only about maximizing after-
tax returns.  These are obviously essential to the deterrence analysis that follows and are 
customary in the relevant deterrence literatures.  Second, it is assumed throughout the 
Article that the federal tax laws, as ultimately interpreted by a court, represent the will of 
Congress and are therefore presumptively social-welfare maximizing.  This assumption 
has two components:  First, whatever Congress intends for the tax laws to mean is what 
maximizes social welfare, and this includes both the allocative and distributive 
consequences of the tax laws.  Second, whenever it is unclear what tax treatment 
Congress intended for a particular transaction, that question is answered definitively and 
accurately when a court renders a tax decision.  Both of these assumptions are obviously 
unrealistic.  We all know how Congress (with the President’s help) can and does muck up 
the tax system.  Courts are likewise notorious for getting tax decisions wrong.  
Nevertheless, to render the deterrence analysis tractable, these assumptions—that courts 
are always right and Congressional intent is welfare maximizing—are necessary.  
Moreover, if one is especially troubled by the quality of Congress’s tax lawmaking record 
or by the courts’ performance in tax cases, those issues should be addressed directly.TPF25FPT 
With that lengthy but necessary set up, we can now begin to isolate the factors 
that determine what the optimal ex ante tax-compliance incentives would be in Joe 
                                                 
TP
25
PT I also realize that the vast majority of tax controversies end with a settlement between the IRS and the 
taxpayer, and thus the courts never get an opportunity in most cases to render a final decision on the merits 
of most questions of tax law uncertainty.  Put differently, in most circumstances, the IRS is the final “ex 
post adjudicator” of the question of how the tax laws apply to a particular transaction.  And this fact 
introduces further complications to the deterrence analysis.  I ignore those complications and assume that 
either the Service gets it right (and interprets the unclear tax laws consistently with Congressional intent 
and thus maximization of social welfare) or the Services decision gets reviewed by a court that sets things 
right. 
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Taxpayer’s situation.  This part of the analysis relies on the traditional lens of deterrence 
theory as it has been developed in the economic analysis of legal rules.TPF26FPT  In that 
literature, the two most important normative questions are (a) what is the optimal liability 
rule – e.g., strict liability or some variant of negligence or fault; and (b) what is the 
optimal level of damages (in the private enforcement context) or the optimal fine (in the 
public enforcement context).TPF27FPT  Applying this framework, it should be clear, as an initial 
matter (although it is never expressed this way in the tax compliance literature), that if 
Joe Taxpayer’s position is certain to be scrutinized by the Service (i.e., there is no audit 
lottery, because the probability of detection is one), the optimal tax liability rule is strict 
liability, and the optimal fine is simply the amount of additional taxes owed plus an 
appropriate interest charge to account for the time value of money.  This combination 
will produce the right ex ante compliance incentives and will induce Joe to make the 
investment described above only if it is efficient to do so. 
What’s interesting about this conclusion is that such a strict tax liability rule will 
induce the taxpayer to behave optimally with respect to the question of legal uncertainty; 
in particular, it will give him the incentive to choose the optimal threshold probability of 
success on the merits.  In the above example, the social-welfare-maximizing choice 
would be for Joe to make the investment if the probability that the position will be upheld 
on the merits is greater than 0.25, but not otherwise.  Why so?  Because for any 
probability of success on the merits greater than 0.25, the transaction is a positive net-
                                                 
TP
26
PT See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987); and A. Mitchell Polinsky, An 
Introduction to Law and Economics. 
TP
27
PT For a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of deterrence in the context of public enforcement 
of legal rules, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 
Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, forthcoming 2007. 
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present-value investment after taxes, but not otherwise. TPF28FPT  A couple of simple examples 
illustrate this point:  Say the probability of success on the merits for this transaction were 
30 percent.  In that case, the expected tax cost associated with the investment would be 
$70, still less than the pre-tax profit of $75; hence, the deal, for Joe and for society, is 
worth pursuing. TPF29FPT  And if the probability-of-success-on-the-merits were 20 percent, the 
expected tax cost would be $80, which would make the deal a $5 loser in after-tax 
terms.TPF30FPT  Thus, given these numbers, the optimal merits probability threshold is 25 
percent.  This number is entirely an artifact of the arbitrary parameters of the example.  
But the more general point still holds:  Assuming detection certainty (i.e., that every tax 
issue gets evaluated by a court and thus that all ex ante uncertainty gets resolved ex post), 
a rule of strict tax liability that requires the taxpayer to pay the additional taxes ex post in 
the event the Service or a court finds his position to have been wrong will induce him to 
internalize his ex ante expected tax liability, and this will work whatever numbers we use 
in the example. 
To put the point even more generally, when taxpayers face conditions of legal 
uncertainty, social welfare is maximized if they make investment decisions on the basis 
of their best estimate of the ultimate resolution of that uncertainty.  To achieve this result, 
we want to make individuals and firms internalize the expected value of the harm that 
their decisions might cause – which harm, in this instance, would be the amount of under-
paid taxes.  This conclusion is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the economic 
analysis of tort law, where cost-internalization through strict liability is well understood 
                                                 
TP
28
PT If you know the pre-tax profit of the transaction will be $75 and you know the potential tax outcomes are 
either zero or $100 in taxes, the optimal merits probability threshold can be calculated by solving for x in 
the following equation:  (x * 0) + ((1-x) * 100) = 75. 
TP
29
PT The expected tax cost using these numbers is calculated as follows:  (0.3 * 0) + (0.7 * 100) =  $70. 
TP
30
PT (.2 * 0) + (0.8 * 100) = $80. 
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to achieve efficiency in certain settings and under assumptions similar to those made in 
this Article.TPF31FPT  For example, in the products liability context, if a product manufacturer is 
trying to decide whether to manufacture and sell a particular product (or whether to make 
a particular safety innovation in an existing product), the existence of a strict liability tort 
rule induces that company ex ante to take into account the expected harm that its product 
might cause (or the expected reduction in harm that the safety innovation might yield.)TPF32FPT  
In essence, this is what a tax strict liability does as well. 
Thus, a regime that makes Joe Taxpayer pay the $100 in back taxes in the event 
the Service and courts reject his tax position will induce him to make the social-welfare 
maximizing ex ante choice regarding when to take advantage of a given legally uncertain 
tax benefit.TP F33FPT  It is also worth making two other aspects of this conclusion explicit:  First, 
it highlights the fact that there is no a priori correct merits probability threshold apart 
from what is optimal under the circumstances as described above.TPF34FPT  Second, the optimal 
merits probability threshold will depend on a number of factors, including:  the amount of 
the potential tax cost (or tax savings) associated with the transaction if the taxpayer loses 
(or wins), the amount (and the certainty) of the pre-tax profit expected from the 
transaction, and, if we lower the assumption of risk neutrality, the taxpayer’s taste for risk 
                                                 
TP
31
PT Shavell, supra note __. 
TP
32
PT Id. 
TP
33
PT Henceforth, I ignore the requirement that the award include adequate interest to account for the time 
value of money.  This is a customary assumption in the economic analysis of legal rules.  In the real world, 
of course, the interest charge that the law imposes on taxpayers for tax deficiencies does not precisely equal 
the rate at which the taxpayer was able to invest those funds.  The tax system’s failure to calibrate interest 
charges properly can produce over- or under-deterrence, just as if the amount of taxes owed were over-
stated or under-stated. 
TP
34
PT This conclusion is largely a function of the current strong assumptions.  That is, I am assuming that the 
only deterrent here is the formal penalty.  Not only is Joe Taxpayer not subject to any informal sanctions 
from his colleagues or peers for being too aggressive on his tax returns, but he has no conscience either: He 
does whatever is optimal under the law.  Of course, informal sanctions do exist, and most people do have a 
conscience, and the entire deterrence calculus can change when those facts are admitted.  I return to this 
possibility at the end of the paper. 
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(though I have assumed risk neutrality to this point).  Thus, for example, all else equal, 
the higher the potential tax cost (or savings) associated the transaction, the higher the 
minimal threshold probability of success on the merits will be. TPF35FPT  This makes intuitive 
sense: If the tax aspect of a particular transaction is very large relative to the expected 
pre-tax profit from that transaction, we want the taxpayer – and the taxpayer himself 
should want – to be darn sure about the substantive law in question before going forward 
with the deal.  Along the same lines, the relationship between the expected pre-tax profit 
and the optimal merits probability threshold makes intuitive sense:  If the non-tax aspect 
of a particular deal is large relative to the tax savings, the taxpayer can afford (and 
society would want him) to be more aggressive in his interpretation of uncertain tax laws.   
A number of interesting observations follow from this analysis.  First, even if the 
probability of success on the merits for a given tax position is extremely low, it can be 
socially optimal for the taxpayer to engage in the transaction and take the questionably 
legal position, so long as he believes that the expected pre-tax profit from the transaction 
exceeds the expected tax liability.  This is a point that is sufficiently counterintuitive (and 
interesting) to bear restating in a slightly different way:  Socially optimal behavior, in a 
world with substantive legal uncertainty, can, and often will, include actions that turn out, 
after the substantive legal uncertainty is resolved, to have been illegal.  That is just 
another way of saying that, whenever there is substantive legal uncertainty, it is not the 
case that inaction – or declining to interpret the uncertain law in one’s favor – is always 
the best, social-welfare-maximizing approach.  In yet other words, where the substantive 
                                                 
TP
35
PT To see this using my example, imagine that the potential tax outcomes were multiplied by 3 (i.e., either 
$300 or zero in taxes).  In that case, the threshold probability of success on the merits would be tripled as 
well (to 0.75).  This can be determined by setting the expected profit from the transaction ($75) equal to (x 
* 0) + ((1-x) * 300) and solving for x. 
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law is uncertain, conservatism in interpreting the law is not always optimal; to the 
contrary, sometimes optimality calls for aggressiveness in the face of substantive legal 
uncertainty. 
This conclusion depends critically on the probability of detection being one – that 
is, the complete absence of detection uncertainty.  If the probability of detection is less 
than one, this conclusion obviously does not follow, unless there is a penalty large 
enough to approximate the effect of detection certainty, as will be discussed at some 
length below.  So let me be very clear:  I am not advocating a regime that encourages or 
allows taxpayers to take tax positions that have a very low probability of success on the 
merits – which is one way of understanding what is normally meant by an “aggressive” 
tax positions – unless we have in place a deterrence regime that either makes detection a 
certainty or imposes an ex post punitive penalty that has roughly the same ex ante effect 
as certain detection.     
A second interesting observation that flows from the analysis above is that the 
strict tax liability rule works even for transactions that promise no pre-tax profit, that is, 
in circumstances in which the tax position in question – i.e., the special deduction or 
credit or whatever – is what makes the deal potentially profitable.  Put differently, strict 
tax liability produces optimal compliance incentives not only in situations in which the 
transaction depends on the tax outcome for its overall profitability, but also in situations 
in which a transaction is expected to produce a pre-tax loss.  These sorts of transactions 
are, of course, the source of much debate in the tax literature and are sometimes given 
pejorative labels such as “abusive tax shelters” or transactions that “lack economic 
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substance.”TPF36FPT  And yet even for such transactions, if the probability of detection is 100 
percent and everyone knows this, a simple strict tax liability rule optimizes taxpayer 
compliance incentives.   
The Joe Taxpayer example can be tweaked slightly to illustrate this last point:  
Assume now that the transaction is expected to lose $5 before taxes but promises the 
possibility of either producing a tax liability of $50 (for an after-tax loss of $55) or, 
perhaps by producing a credit or a loss deduction that can be used to offset taxes from 
some other source, a net tax savings of $100 (for an after-tax gain of $95).  Given those 
possibilities, the break-even or optimal merits probability threshold for Joe’s situation is 
roughly 0.3; that is, Joe will be willing to engage in the transaction – and, from an 
efficiency perspective, should be willing to engage in the transaction – if the probability 
that this position will win on the merits is anything greater than 30 percent, but not 
otherwise.TPF37FPT  Of course, the precise probability threshold is entirely an artifact of the 
numbers that I have chosen for the example, but the point is fairly general:  Because the 
strict tax liability rule forces Joe to internalize the ex ante expected value of his ex post 
tax liability, he will invest in the transaction only if it is optimal to do so, which means he 
will choose the optimal merits probability threshold, whatever that may be under the 
circumstances. 
IV.  The Problem of Detection Uncertainty and the Bentham-Becker Solution 
                                                 
TP
36
PT Obviously, not all tax transactions that have are expected to have pre-tax losses but post-tax gains are 
considered abusive tax shelters.  For example, some transactions that are designed to exploit explicit tax 
subsidy provisions in the Code – which we might call “intended loopholes” – fall into this category. One of 
the biggest issues in the tax shelter literature, arguably the central issue in that debate, is the question how 
to distinguish the unintended from the intended tax loopholes.  For the purposes of this Article, again, I am 
assuming that the IRS and the courts can figure this out in their ex post evaluations of tax positions. 
TP
37
PT To get this percentage, set (x * 100) + ((1-x) * (-50)) equal to -5, and then solve for x. 
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The preceding analysis assumed, among many other things, that the probability of 
detection – the combined probability that the taxpayer’s return would be selected for 
audit and the particular issue in question would be scrutinized – was equal to one.  This is 
an especially fanciful assumption in the tax context, at least with respect to the sort of 
sophisticated transactions that this Article is focusing on, transactions that involve 
navigating the intended and unintended loopholes in the Code.  For such transactions, the 
probability of detection is notoriously low.  This is true both because the audit rate itself 
is far less than 100 percent and because, even when a return is audited, there is a good 
chance such tax positions will go unnoticed by the Service.TPF38FPT  Although no one knows 
what the precise probability of detection is for any given type of tax position (even the 
IRS, which does have data on audit rates for different categories of taxpayers and has 
confidential information about its own enforcement priorities, cannot know what the 
ultimate detection probability is for a particular tax position), such probability is almost 
certainly very low for many of the transactions that characterize the zone of substantive 
legal uncertainty.  The result, of course, is that a tax penalty regime of strict liability in 
which the only penalty is the “harm,” the additional taxes plus interest, woefully under-
deters.  Thus, with probability of detection significantly below one, unless we assume 
massive levels of risk aversion, taxpayers have an incentive to engage in transactions 
(and take tax positions) that are far too aggressive from an overall social welfare 
                                                 
TP
38
PT According to the most recent IRS statistics, the 2005 audit rates were as follows:  all individuals (0.9 
percent); individuals with over $10,000 of income (1.5 percent); individuals with under $100,000 of 
income (0.8 percent); all corporations (20 percent); large corporations (those with assets over $250 million) 
(44 percent); small businesses (those with assets under $10 million) (0.8 percent).  I.R.S. Data Book (IRS 
pub. 55B), available on line at HTUhttp://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05db10ex.xls UTH.  Based on research from data 
from earlier years, it appears that, of those taxpayers who are audited, only a small percentage (as low as 4 
percent)  are actually penalized.  James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathon Feinstein, 37 J. Econ. Lit. 818 
(1998).  Note that audit rates for individuals are much higher for certain types of errors, such as omitting 
income that is reported on information returns.  Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance p.8 (2002 NBER 
working paper W9817), available on line at HTUhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=330326UTH. 
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perspective.  Indeed, the current problem of the “tax gap” – the difference between the 
taxes owed and the taxes paid – is almost certainly a result of the fact that the vast 
majority of taxpayers who underpay their taxes never get caught, and everyone knows 
that. 
The effect of detection uncertainty on taxpayer aggressiveness can easily be 
illustrated by making a small but important change to the Joe Taxpayer example.  
Imagine the situation as described in the original example above (i.e., $75 expected pre-
tax profit with a potential tax liability of $100 or $0), except that the probability of 
detection is not 100 percent but is, say, 1 percent.  If the fine is then set equal to the 
amount of back-taxes owed (i.e., the tax analog to the “harm” caused) with no additional 
penalty, the taxpayer would have an incentive to make the investment in reliance on the 
tax position in question even if the probability of winning the position on the merits were 
zero – that is, even if the tax position were clearly illegal.TPF39FPT  Indeed, in the current Joe 
Taxpayer example, this would be true – Joe would have an incentive to make the 
investment despite the position’s being unquestionably illegal – for any probability of 
detection less than 75 percent.TPF40FPT  Again, the particular numbers are arbitrary, but the 
principle is not.  The point is quite generalizable and, for that matter, well known among 
tax practitioners and analysts:  the lower the rates of detection, all else equal, the larger 
the incentive for taxpayers to take aggressive tax positions.TPF41FPT 
                                                 
TP
39
PT The expected value of the $100 in taxes would be $1, although the probability of winning on the merits if 
detected is zero; and $1 is obviously less than the pre-tax profit expected from the transaction. 
TP
40
PT This is because the expected pre-tax profit is $75, so the expected fine would have to be $75 or greater.  
If the position is patently illegal, given the potential tax liability of $100, the expected tax liability will be 
less than $75 for any probability of detection less than 75 percent. 
TP
41
PT The one possible qualification to this observation involves the interaction between formal and informal 
sanctions.  That is, if people are prevented from taking illegal positions by informal norms, either internal 
ones (conscience) or external ones (reputation), then this relationship between rates of detection and 
willingness to take aggressive, or clearly illegal, positions may not hold. 
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The problem of low probabilities of detection is one of the oldest and most 
thoroughly discussed issues in the entire deterrence literature.  At least since Jeremy 
Bentham, theorists have understood the relationship between the probability of detection, 
the magnitude of the penalty, and the appropriate level of deterrence.TPF42FPT  It was Gary 
Becker who first formalized the notion in the criminal law context and who further 
identified the optimal solution to the problem (given certain assumptions to be discussed 
shortly):  to increase the ex post penalty until the potential perpetrator is induced ex ante 
to act as if the probability of detection were one.TPF43FPT  To be precise, such a Bentham-
Becker penalty is calculated by dividing the harm caused by the probability of detection.  
Thus, if a crime is expected to cause a harm of 100, such that the optimal cost-
internalizing sanction would be $100, but the probability of detection is .01, the optimal 
fine would be $10,000 – that is, the amount of the harm – 100 – divided by the 
probability of detection – 0.01 (Or, if you prefer multiplying, the amount of harm 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the detection probability).  This is so precisely because 
such a penalty makes the expected value of the fine equal the harm.  Thus, in general, so 
long as (a) the ex post adjudicator can accurately determine both the ex ante probability 
of detection and the amount of the harm (for purposes of this Article, the actual taxes 
owed as determined by the adjudicator in resolving the legal uncertainty), (b) taxpayers 
or their advisors are aware of this fact, and (c) taxpayers have sufficient assets at risk to 
care about large ex post penalty, then the use of such an ex post penalty regime can create 
the proper ex ante tax compliance incentives.  Indeed, under such a regime, it is as if the 
probability of detection were equal to one and the fine equaled the harm.  This same 
                                                 
TP
42
PT Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 Works of Jeremy 
Bentham 1, 86-91 (J. Browning ed. 1843). 
TP
43
PT Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). 
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analysis has been applied to justify punitive damages in tort law and environmental law, 
among many other areas.TPF44FPT  Public finance economists have applied this idea to tax law 
as well, reaching the conclusion that, under the normal assumptions, the optimal fine for 
tax underpayments ought to be the amount of tax underpayment divided by the 
probability of detection.TPF45FPT 
To see the operation of this idea in the tax context, take the original Joe Taxpayer 
example but assume a probability of detection of one percent.  In such a case, Joe’s ex 
ante compliance incentive would be optimized by applying a strict liability standard that 
assessed an overall fine – including both the back taxes and penalty – equal to the harm 
(the additional taxes owed of $100) multiplied by 100 (i.e., 1/.01).  Thus, in the event the 
tax position was detected and rejected, Joe would be required to pay not only the 
underpaid tax, but also a punitive fine (or a “kicker”) of $9,900.TPF46FPT  By adopting a rule that 
would impose such a fine in the event of an adverse determination, the strict-liability-
plus-punitive-kicker rule forces Joe, ex ante, to internalize the expected tax liability 
associated with the transaction, which, as shown above, leads to the optimal tax 
compliance incentives even under conditions of legal uncertainty.  (Again, this 
conclusion assumes Joe has at least $10,000 worth of assets that might be subject to the 
ex post penalty.)  Recall that under the original example, Joe’s optimal merits probability 
threshold was 25 percent.  He should only make the investment if he assessed the 
likelihood of winning on the merits to be greater than 25 percent.  Now, if the probability 
                                                 
TP
44
PT See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 869 (1998). 
TP
45
PT M. G. Allingham and A. Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323-38 
(1972). 
TP
46
PT Since the optimal total damage payment is determined by harm divided by the probability of detection 
(h/p), and the optimal punitive award is the amount in excess of the actual harm, the multiplier that can be 
used to calculate the punitive-kicker part of the award can be written as:  [(1-p)/p] * p. 
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of detection were 1 percent rather than 100 percent, but the potential total tax liability 
were $10,000 rather than just $100, Joe would still have an incentive to make the 
investment (and claim the $100 tax benefit) only if doing so were socially efficient – that 
is, only if the 25 percent merits probability were exceeded.   
In sum, a strict liability rule with a Bentham-Becker punitive penalty can induce 
optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives in a world with substantively uncertain tax law 
and in which taxpayer aggressiveness regularly goes undetected.  Applying the strict-
liability-with-punitive-kicker regime, however, raises a number of conceptual and 
practical problems.  These are the ex post unfairness concern; the judgment-proof 
taxpayer problem; the over-deterrence problem; and the administrability problem.  I 
discuss the first three in this section and the fourth in the next section.  Some but not all 
of these concerns will apply to both a strict liability and a fault-based regime.  All of 
them are connected with, and even attributable to, the punitive-kicker aspect of the tax-
penalty regime proposed in the previous section. 
First, even if we assume that taxpayers are perfectly rational and informed (and 
thus would be optimally deterred by a Bentham-Becker penalty), there is the view that 
the Bentham-Becker punitive penalty would create a kind of ex post unfairness because 
of the relationship, or lack of relationship, between the size of the penalty and the 
magnitude of the offense.   In the criminal law context, this complaint against Bentham-
Becker penalties is often stated in terms of the punishment being out of proportion to the 
crime.  Thus, for example, if an individual were to break the law and cause a social harm 
of $100, a sanction of $10,000 on that single individual would, on this view, be 
considered excessive – disproportionate to the crime.  The same could be said in the tax 
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context.  If a taxpayer underpays his income by $100, and the particular mistake has only 
a 1 percent chance of being detected, it seems intuitively unfair that the 1 person out of 
100 who gets caught will have to pay $10,000 while the other 99 go free.  And such an 
outcome seems especially problematic when the activity in question, from an ex ante 
perspective, is not clearly illegal – but is only of uncertain legality. 
This injustice may be seen as further compounded by the fact that the size of the 
tax penalties imposed on taxpayers may in many cases reward dishonesty, in the 
following sense:  If the IRS were to concentrate its enforcement efforts on identifying 
those taxpayers who are most likely to cheat on their taxes (a reasonable strategy), the 
probability of detection for those taxpayers would increase, relative to the probability of 
detection of the taxpayers who are not so much the focus of IRS scrutiny.  The irony of 
this approach, however, is that the punitive kicker would correspondingly be lower for 
those relatively dishonest taxpayers (the ones whom the IRS is focusing on) and higher 
for the more honest taxpayers (to whom the Service gives less frequent or intense 
scrutiny).  Thus, if we loosely equate audit rates with detection rates, taxpayers subject to 
only a 1 percent audit rate because of their historically high levels of compliance would 
face a potential noncompliance penalty equal to 100 times their tax understatements; 
whereas the taxpayers subject to a 50 percent audit rate because of their historically low 
levels of compliance would face a potential penalty of only 2.  Of course, audit rates are 
not necessarily inversely correlated with relative honesty.  For example, it may be 
administratively or politically more feasible to audit certain taxpayers at higher rates than 
others.  But the perception of unfairness could still be a problem.TPF47FPT 
                                                 
TP
47
PT One could argue that these ex post unfairness concerns are not present under the assumptions of the 
examples above, specifically, the assumption of perfectly informed and rational taxpayers.  That is, if 
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Besides the ex post unfairness problems, there is a potential deterrence problem as 
well.  The problem is simple: a rational taxpayer of the sort I have been assuming 
throughout this analysis (including an assumption of risk neutrality) would ignore the 
threat of any ex post fine that exceeds the amount of her assets that are available to 
satisfy a tax judgment.  This fact – sometimes called the judgment-proof problem – limits 
the ability of large ex post fines to produce optimal ex ante compliance incentives.  The 
problem is well known in the deterrence literature, and what it means is that, even with a 
Bentham-Becker punitive penalty in place, if taxpayers are judgment proof, they will be 
under-deterred.TPF48FPT 
Interestingly, there is also an over-deterrence concern with the punitive-kicker 
penalty, although it requires that we assume risk aversion on the part of the taxpayers.   
Putting aside the judgment-proof problem for the moment, the prospect of large tax 
penalties in conjunction with a strict liability rule can actually over-deter, that is, induce 
taxpayers to under-invest in legally uncertain tax positions.  The point is simple enough 
to understand:  Risk-averse taxpayers facing a potentially large ex post tax penalty in the 
event their uncertain tax positions end up losing in court might be deterred from taking 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxpayers are perfectly informed of the merits probability of a particular tax position, perfectly informed of 
the likelihood of detection, and perfectly informed of the potential Bentham-Becker penalty they face, then 
no unfairness arises when they freely choose to assume the risk of taking the tax position in question.  That 
is, under these assumptions, when a taxpayer’s uncertain position happens to be detected by the IRS and 
happens to be rejected and the penalty assessed, that would be an example of what Ronald Dworkin calls 
“option luck.”  And to allow the taxpayer to bear the consequences of his bad option luck is, on this 
influential view of distributive justice, entirely appropriate.  See generally Ronald Dworkin, “What is 
Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 185-245 and T“What is 
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345. T  However, 
insofar as the taxpayer’s decision to engage in the uncertain tax position, and hence to subject himself to 
the risk of a large tax penalty, is influenced by irrationality or incomplete information (and thus the risk is 
in some sense not freely chosen), we might consider the result a form of bad “brute luck,” which Dworkin 
(and most every egalitarian theorist) would regard as an appropriate grounds for redistributive intervention.  
Not everyone, not even every philosopher, is prepared to fully embrace this distinction between option luck 
and brute luck. 
TP
48
PT This problem is acknowledged in the standard works on the Bentham-Becker approach to punitive 
sanctions.  See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra note __, at __. 
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such positions in the first place – even when taking such positions, although not certain to 
be upheld on the merits, are well above the efficient merits probability threshold.  That is, 
they would be deterred from making investments that they should make.  Thus, for 
example, when the likelihood of succeeding on the merits for a particular transaction is, 
say, 40 percent, we know that it would be efficient for the tax to make the investment if 
the optimal merits probability threshold is less than 40 percent.  (In the Joe Taxpayer 
example above, recall, that threshold was 25 percent.)  However, if the taxpayer is risk 
averse, the possibility of a $10,000 ex post tax liability might dissuade the taxpayer from 
going through with even a tax-efficient transaction, that is, even though the expected tax 
liability would be significantly less than the expected pre-tax profit.  In that sense, then, if 
taxpayers are risk averse, a full punitive-kicker penalty can over-deter and discourage 
efficient transactions. 
Some readers may scoff at this over-deterrence concern.  They might say, for 
example, that, while over-deterrence may be a theoretical possibility, it is a miniscule 
concern in the real-world of tax enforcement.  The much bigger problem, the argument 
goes, is under-deterrence.  The whole problem of corporate tax shelters, for example, 
which has occupied so many pages in Tax Notes, The Wall Street Journal, and The New 
York Times in recent years, is in essence a problem of under-deterrence.  Moreover, the 
Treasury Department continues to report a substantial federal tax gap of roughly 16 
percent – that is, federal tax revenues are estimated to be approximately 16 percent less 
than they would be if all taxpayers paid what they actually owe.TPF49FPT  Thus, one might 
reasonably ask, how serious can the over-deterrence problem really be?  My own view, 
                                                 
TP
49
PT IRS, Understanding the Tax Gap, FS-2005-14, March 2005, available on line at 
HTUhttp://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137246,00.html UTH. 
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based on very little evidence, is that, presently, the over-deterrence problem is probably 
small, though not non-existent.  Even now, I have heard anecdotal accounts of taxpayers 
who are not willing to engage in certain types of transactions that are tax sensitive 
because the tax law is too uncertain, and because they cannot get the IRS to issue them a 
private letter ruling on the issue.  But I have no idea how large this problem is.  The much 
more important point is that, even if it were the case that there is presently relatively little 
over-deterrence under the current tax penalty regime, we obviously do not currently have 
anything resembling a Bentham-Becker penalty regime.  As discussed above, maximum 
penalties are limited to usually 20 percent, rarely higher than 75 percent, of the underpaid 
tax.  These amounts are obviously far, far less than the penalties that would be the norm 
under a Bentham-Becker model, which again would be 5, 10, or even 100 times the tax 
underpayment.  If such large penalties were authorized, it is reasonable to suppose that it 
would not be very long before complaints of over-deterrence would dominate the tax 
news coverage. 
V.  The Potential Role of (and the Problems with) Tax Liability Insurance 
Before we get to the administrability problems with the strict tax liability 
punitive-kicker regime, consider a possible, at least partial, solution to the ex post 
unfairness and over-deterrence concerns.  These concerns could be reduced if we allowed 
(and the judgment-proof problem could be reduced if we required) taxpayers to purchase 
insurance against the possibility that a particular tax position on their return might be 
rejected by the IRS and back-taxes and fines imposed.  The insurance would cover the 
back-taxes, interest, penalties, and perhaps the legal fees as well.TPF50FPT  What would the 
                                                 
TP
50
PT Such insurance is not merely a theoretical possibility.  There is in fact a small but growing market for this 
insurance.  See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 339 
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effect of such insurance be?  In theory, assuming actuarially priced insurance, such an 
innovation would convert the large ex post fines that would threaten taxpayers under the 
Bentham-Becker kicker regime into something approximating the taxpayer’s ex ante 
expected tax liability.  This theoretical result would be as close to the ideal tax treatment 
of legally uncertain tax transactions as we can get, both from a deterrence perspective and 
a distributive justice perspective.  To see this point, go back to the original example 
where the efficient merits probability threshold was 25 percent, owing to the $75 
expected pre-tax profit and $100/$0 potential tax liability.  And assume again that the 
detection probability for the transaction is 1 percent, such that the optimal punitive 
penalty is $9,900, plus the $100 tax liability.  Now imagine that the taxpayer finds a 
particular transaction that fits this profile and that has a merits probability of 40 percent.  
Thus, the taxpayer’s expected tax liability is $60. TPF51FPT  Because his expected after-tax profit 
is $15, he should clearly make the investment.  Now here’s the trick:  Assume further that 
there are 99,999 other taxpayers in the economy taking a similar position, by which I 
mean a tax position with the same payoff structure as Joe’s – i.e., an expected tax liability 
of $60.  Assume also that all of these tax positions are uncorrelated with one another, in 
the sense that when one uncertain position is resolved by the IRS or a court ex post, that 
decision has no effect on how the other cases will be resolved.TPF52FPT  According to these 
assumptions, only 1000 of these taxpayers will get audited, 600 of whom will lose their 
cases and be required to pay the $100 in taxes plus the $9,900 Bentham-Becker punitive 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2005), for a description of this types of insurance and the deterrence concerns it can raise.  An alternative 
to commercially provided tax liability insurance would be government provided tax insurance.  Private 
letter rulings can be seen as a form of government provided insurance against substantive uncertainty in the 
tax law. 
TP
51
PT  (0.4 * 0) + [(0.6 * $100)] = $60 
TP
52
PT I’ll have more to say about this assumption later in the paper, when I introduce the possibility of risk 
averse taxpayers and the option of tax risk liability insurance. 
37
Logue:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2006
Discussion Draft 39
fine.  Again, such a rule produces the right ex ante incentives.  The problem, according to 
the ex post unfairness complaint, is that 600 unlucky souls are required to pay $10,000 
each, while the other 999,400 taxpayers, who are in exactly the same position and who 
took exactly the same risk, pay nothing.  That result could be seen as distributively 
unjust. 
Along comes tax insurance to the rescue.  Because each of the 100,000 taxpayers 
in this example have an expected tax liability of $60 each – each is taking a 0.006 chance 
of paying a $10,000 tax-plus-penalty liability – tax liability insurance, in its idealized 
form, would allow these taxpayers to shift the risk of a $10,000 payment to the insurer in 
exchange for paying the insurer a premium of roughly $60.  If such insurance were 
provided, then, when the 1000 out of the 100,000 taxpayers were selected for audit, and 
600 of those ended up losing their cases, the insurer would pay the $10,000 total tax 
liability for each of the 600 unlucky ones.TPF53FPT  In so doing, the insurer would be acting in 
effect as a private ex ante tax collector, collecting premiums of $60 from each of the 
taxpayers in the pool in advance and then eventually paying those premiums over to the 
government (less an administrative fee). 
If it worked, this type of tax insurance could reduce the over-deterrence problem 
as well as the ex post unfairness (or perceived unfairness) associated with the Bentham-
Becker punitive sanction.  The over-deterrence problem goes away because the threat of a 
large ex post fine goes away.  The ex post unfairness concern is addressed through the 
operation of insurance risk pooling.  So, unlike the Bentham-Becker penalty without 
insurance, where $6,000,000 was spread across 600 taxpayers, here $6,000,000 is spread 
                                                 
TP
53
PT The insurer could also cover the litigation costs of all 1000 selected for audit. But we can assume that 
away for now. 
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equally among 100,000 taxpayers.  Moreover, if we assume that the insurer could set and 
adjust premiums perfectly to correlate with the expected tax liabilities of its insureds (this 
is what I meant above by the assumption of actuarially fair insurance), the strict liability 
rule with a Bentham-Becker penalty would still produce optimal ex ante compliance.  
Because taxpayers would still ex ante face the expected tax liability associated with the 
investment, they would be induced to make the efficient decision regarding when to 
invest in reliance on uncertain tax law. 
This rosy picture ignores many complications that might make such tax risk 
insurance infeasible.  But one problem is more fundamental than the others:  To the 
extent the tax insurer is not able to classify risks perfectly, there would be a degree of 
both ex post unfairness and inefficiency.  Imagine that the insurer in the example above 
could not distinguish between a taxpayer who is engaging in a transaction with an 
expected tax liability of $60 and a taxpayer who is making an investment with an 
expected tax liability of $70 or $50.  To the insurer, these all look the same.  If that were 
true, there would be inefficiency, because taxpayers would not face their own expected 
tax liability.  Some taxpayers who are insured would thus be induced to make 
investments that are excessively aggressive.  For example, a taxpayer might represent to 
an insurer that it was going to engage in a transaction with an expected tax liability of 
$60 and then turn around and, in fact, engage in a transaction with an expected tax 
liability of $70.  This is a version of the well-known problem of moral hazard that 
plagues all insurance arrangements to some extent.  Likewise, those taxpayers who 
expected to be engaging in relatively tax-risky transactions (the $70 expected value 
transactions) would find the $60 premium to a bargain and would be disproportionately 
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likely to purchase insurance.  This would force premiums up over time, causing the 
lower-risk taxpayers on the margin to opt out of buying insurance, thus leaving them 
uninsured and, again, potentially over-deterred.  This is of course the tax-insurance 
version of adverse selection.  When there is variance within insurance risk pools, there is 
concomitantly cross-subsidization from the low risk to the high risk insureds, which 
arguably presents an ex ante unfairness concern. 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and cross-subsidization occur to some extent in 
all insurance markets and are not considered per se fatal to the enterprise.  Insurers 
generally try to combat these problems in a myriad of ways, not the least of which by 
engaging in ex ante efforts at risk classification and contractual protection.  For example, 
a tax-risk insurer who is approached about covering a particular tax transaction might 
hire its own tax experts to evaluate the legal merits of the proposed tax treatment.  This 
would help the insurer to decide whether to offer the coverage, at what price, and under 
what terms.  And to mitigate the problem of moral-hazard – that is, the taxpayer who says 
she is planning a transaction with a $60 tax risk but then proceeds to do a transaction with 
a risk of $70 – the insurer could, in advance of the transaction, require the taxpayer to 
provide detailed representations regarding the proposed transaction (details suggested by 
the insurer’s tax experts), and the breach of these representations by the taxpayer would 
be grounds for the insurer to void the contract.  Plus, insurers could use a combination of 
large deductibles and contractual policy exclusions to try to align reduce moral hazard 
and adverse selection concerns.  Insurers have used these tools for decades in liability and 
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other insurance markets.  And, interestingly, they are beginning to use them now in the 
small but growing tax risk insurance market.TPF54FPT 
Another serious problem with tax risk insurance, a problem that potentially 
confronts all premium-financed insurance arrangements, is the possibility of correlated 
risks.  In the example above I assumed that all 100,000 taxpayers were engaging in 
transactions that posed the same tax risk but that were uncorrelated with other.  Those are 
the perfect conditions for the insurance risk-spreading mechanism to work.  I have 
already discussed what happens when the risks being insured have different expected 
values – the problem of insufficiently precise risk classification.  But what happens if the 
tax risks are correlated?  If the insurer has not reinsured the risk, and if the correlated 
risks represent a large fraction of the insurer’s overall book of business, the result can be 
bankruptcy for the insurer.  To see this, change the example so that all of the 100,000 
taxpayers are doing precisely the same transaction, or they are doing transactions that 
turn on exactly the same uncertain legal question, such that if the legal uncertainty is 
resolved in one case, it gets resolved in all of them, virtually simultaneously.  In that case, 
if those taxpayers were the only risks the insurer covered, and it had no reinsurance and 
no large surplus of assets, it would not be able to price the policies.  It cannot charge just 
$60 for the policies, because if a court decides against one of the taxpayers, there would 
not be sufficient funds to cover all of the claims.  The insurer would have $6 million in 
premiums, but would need $100 million, since all 1000 taxpayers selected for audit 
would lose their cases.  Also, the insurer would not be able to charge much more than 
$60, because the taxpayer-insureds would not be willing to pay it.  Certainly taxpayers 
would not be willing to pay a premium of $100 (equal to the taxes they hoped to avoid 
                                                 
TP
54
PT This is in fact what happens with tax transaction liability insurance.  See Logue, supra note __. 
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paying on the transaction), which would be necessary to give the insurer certainty that it 
would be able to pay the claims when they come in. TPF55FPT 
This correlated-risk problem is potentially troubling, given that some uncertain 
tax issues are correlated with each other.  This is especially true insofar as taxpayers tend 
to copy each other’s tax transactions.  However, the correlated-risk problem seems 
ultimately unlikely to prevent a tax risk insurance market from arising if a Bentham-
Becker punitive-kicker tax penalty regime were adopted.  Why?  First, there are many 
different sources of transactional tax-law uncertainty, almost as many as there are 
sections in the Code.  And there would rarely be perfect correlation of risks, even when 
taxpayers attempt to engage in very similar transactions.  Often the tax treatment will turn 
on highly fact-specific issues that will be peculiar to the particular transaction and 
particular taxpayer.  For that reason, it would be surprising if an insurer could not put 
together a portfolio of tax-law risks that were relatively diversified, or uncorrelated with 
each other.  Moreover, insurers can, and usually do, reinsure their risks with other, larger 
insurers that have larger and more diversified portfolios.  For the very large insurers, 
since their tax insurance business would be only a small part of their own portfolio, this 
diversification function would be performed largely in house. 
One complaint that gets lodged against allowing tax risk insurance in the current 
regulatory climate is that the availability of tax insurance will exacerbate an already 
existing under-deterrence problem.TPF56FPT  The argument is that, given the trivial penalties that 
currently exist for tax noncompliance, the existence of tax-law uncertainty and taxpayer 
risk aversion are necessary to prevent the tax gap from increasing dramatically.  For that 
                                                 
TP
55
PT This is an example of the much more general insurance problem of correlated risks, which can make 
insurance markets fail.   
TP
56
PT See Logue, supra note __, at __. 
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reason, if we allow risk-averse taxpayers to insure their penalties, competition being what 
it is, insurers will eventually offer coverage for transactions that have zero merits 
probability, in which chase the only risk they would be insuring would the risk of 
detection.  Put differently, the worst case scenario with respect to tax risk insurance 
would be insurance for clearly illegal transactions.  I agree that this is a concern under the 
existing penalty structure, and in another Article I have suggested some possible 
solutions, such as requiring taxpayers who purchase tax risk insurance to report this fact 
to the service, thus raising the detection risk, and hence the expected tax liability, for such 
transactions significantly.TPF57FPT  This problem of tax shelter insurance, however, would not 
likely arise – or would be much diminished – under a strict liability penalty regime with a 
Bentham-Becker punitive penalty.  This is so because, if the penalty is set properly, the 
insurance premium for the transaction will equal the expected tax liability.  Which means 
that, for a transaction with a merits probability of zero, the insurance premium would 
equal the potential tax liability, making the deal not worth doing for the taxpayer.TPF58FPT  
Thus, if in our example the merits probability were zero, the insurer would charge the 
taxpayer a premium of $100, efficiently deterring the transaction. 
An alternative to allowing risk-averse taxpayers to purchase tax liability insurance 
from commercial insurance companies would be to allow them to purchase such 
insurance directly from the government.  That is, each of the taxpayers in the example 
above could pay the U.S. Treasury, instead of an insurance company, $60 and in 
exchange receive a commitment that the issue in question would not be challenged.  We 
might think of this as something like a private letter ruling, but one for taxpayers are 
                                                 
TP
57
PT Logue, supra note __, at __. 
TP
58
PT More generally, the liability insurance premium for a clearly illegal activity in a world in which 
accurately calculated Bentham-Becker penalties are imposed would equal the harm in question.  
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required to pay the expected tax liability in advance.  Perhaps the better analogy would be 
to a settlement agreement between a taxpayer and the IRS on some issue that the Service 
has challenged but with respect to which the legal outcome is uncertain.  Interestingly, 
under either approach to dealing with tax law uncertainty – the private insurance 
approach and the government insurance (or settlement) approach – the key facts are that 
the taxpayers would face approximately their expected tax liability when making tax-
sensitive investment decisions, the government would get the right amount of revenue 
under the circumstance ($6 million in our example involving 100,000 taxpayers), and the 
tax burden for these types of transactions would be allocated fairly across all taxpayers 
doing the deal ($60 each).  Whether government insurance or private insurance would be 
the better mechanism for this is beyond the scope of this Article.  The essential point to 
recognize here would be that, under present assumptions, including the assumption of a 
strict liability rule with an ex post Bentham-Becker fine, either would optimize ex ante 
compliance and tax decision making under conditions of uncertainty. 
The most serious difficulty with any attempt to adopt a full-fledged punitive-
kicker tax penalty regime on the Bentham-Becker model is not the ex post injustice or the 
over-deterrence problems, or the problems of imperfect insurance markets.  Rather, the 
most troubling concern is the administrability of the penalty provision itself.  In the 
analysis thus far, it has been assumed that the ex post adjudicator, the IRS or court, would 
be able to determine with perfect accuracy not only the correct answer to the tax question 
at issue but also, for the purpose of calculating the penalty, the particular ex ante 
probability of detection for the particular taxpayer and tax issue under scrutiny.  Such an 
assessment is obviously necessary to calculate the precisely correct cost-internalizing 
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penalty.  But making such an assessment, at least with any degree of precision, would be 
impossible.  That impossibility may well be why the current tax penalty regime falls so 
far short of the Bentham-Becker ideal – with most penalties capped at 20 percent of the 
underpaid tax.  Indeed, some commentators have cited this problem as a reason not even 
to attempt an ex post punitive penalty approach to dealing with the low-probability-of-
protection problem.TPF59FPT  Moreover, this problem is connected specifically to the punitive-
kicker penalty and therefore would apply whether the tax liability rule in place were strict 
liability (as I have been discussing thus far) or fault-based (to be taken up below). 
I agree that neither the IRS nor any court evaluating the merits of a particular tax 
position would be able precisely to calculate the ex ante probability that such a position 
would be detected.  Still, some rough approximation might be possible.  For example, the 
ex post adjudicator, whoever it might be, could begin by relying on the publicly available 
audit rates for various classes of taxpayers.TPF60FPT  Such audit rates would almost certainly 
overstate the probability of detection for many sorts of tax issues that involve substantial 
legal uncertainty, given that many such issues avoid detection even on audit.  But a 
penalty based on audit rates would come much closer to the Bentham-Becker ideal than 
the current regime.  Further, as a means of increasing the accuracy of the penalty for the 
taxpayer in question, the adjudicator might be allowed access to the IRS’s confidential 
information regarding audit strategies and audit probabilities.  And for still further 
refinement, the adjudicator could then consider evidence specific to the individual or 
corporation before it.  Moreover, if we are worried about giving this much enforcement 
                                                 
TP
59
PT See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569 (2006) (pointing out the difficult of such an ex post assessment 
of the ex ante probability of detection). 
TP
60
PT See supra note __. 
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discretion to the IRS or to the courts – that is, the discretion to determine the size of the 
ex post tax penalty based on all of these factors – Congress could enact a schedule of 
punitive fines that would be based on audit rates and that could be somewhat tailored to 
the class of transaction at issue. 
By offering these responses to the administrability problem, I do not mean to be 
suggesting that this is a concern that should be overlooked or taken lightly.  In my view, 
it is very likely that this concern may be sufficient reason not to adopt such a regime.  
However, the question is at least worth further study and should get more attention in the 
literature than it has received. 
To summarize the analysis thus far, under the assumptions laid out in Part III 
above, when the law is substantively uncertain – in the sense that there is a positive-but-
less-than-one probability of success on the merits of the tax position at issue – the 
optimal tax penalty regime would involve a strict liability rule.  (Indeed, under present 
assumptions, a strict liability rule works when the substantive law is certain as well.)  The 
optimal level of penalty, however, depends on the probability of detection.  If detection is 
certain, there is no need for a penalty in excess of the taxes owed plus interest.  If 
detection is uncertain, as it always will be in the cases of interest to the present analysis 
(ones that involve substantive legal uncertainty), the penalty should approximate the 
back-taxes owed plus interest divided by the probability of detection.  That is the famous 
Bentham-Becker kicker.  Such a regime would induce the taxpayer to make optimal 
decisions regarding whether and under what circumstances to rely on uncertain tax law.  
One conclusion made clear by my analysis is that there is no a priori appropriate or 
efficient merits probability threshold or minimum.  Rather, how certain the taxpayer 
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ought to be about the substantive law before relying on it will depend on a number of 
factors, including the size of the potential tax consequences and the potential pre-tax 
profit expected from the investment.  If we are concerned about the potential unfairness 
are over-deterrence effects of very large potential tax penalties – which could be in the 
neighborhood of 5, 10, even 100 times the underpaid tax – then tax-penalty insurance 
could be offered, by private insurers or the government.  Indeed, if a Bentham-Becker 
penalty regime were enacted, such an insurance market would likely arise on its own 
unless prohibited by law, and whether and how to regulate that market would be the 
questions. 
The preceding analysis looked exclusively at a strict liability approach to tax 
penalties.  Under such a regime, when a taxpayer is singled out for enforcement and has a 
tax position rejected by the adjudicator, not only is she held strictly liable for any 
additional tax she is found to owe, but she is also automatically liable for the 
underpayment penalties as well, which penalties ideally (ignoring all of the caveats 
discussed above) would be set according to the Bentham-Becker formula.  The other 
option, of course, involves some form of fault-based or negligence standard for assessing 
penalties.  Indeed, the fault-based alternative is deserving of special attention, given that 
the current tax penalty regime employs a fault-based approach.  The obvious questions 
are whether the fault-based approach could, like the strict liability approach, create 
optimal ex ante tax compliance incentives, and, if so, which regime can do so at lower 
cost.  Relatedly, does the fault-based approach face drawbacks similar to the ones 
discussed above.  In the next section, I explain two fundamental problems with using a 
fault-based standard for tax penalties, at least if the standard of fault is tied to whether the 
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taxpayer satisfied the optimal merits probability threshold.  Then I explain why, 
notwithstanding these problems, there is a second-best argument for adopting, or (more 
accurately) continuing to use, some form of fault-based approach to tax penalties. 
 
VI.  Assessing a Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime 
A.  Defining the Fault-Based Standard:  Applying the Optimal Merits 
Probability Threshold 
If a taxpayer takes a position on her tax return that relies on a substantively 
uncertain interpretation of the tax laws (that is, the probability of success on the merits is 
less than one), and the IRS and the courts decide that the taxpayer happens to be wrong, 
then, as to the assessment of the underpaid taxes plus interest, the rule almost by 
definition has to be strict liability.  That is, if the ex post adjudicator determines that a 
taxpayer owes more taxes than she paid (recall:  we are assuming that the IRS/and courts 
resolve this uncertainty definitely ex post), then that is that.  The taxes must be paid.  You 
cannot get out of paying your taxes simply because the law, ex ante, was uncertain, even 
if your interpretation of the law was reasonable.TPF61FPT  This is because, at bottom, the tax law 
is distributive in nature, and what the adjudicator is resolving is the uncertainty as to what 
the distributive burden of the tax laws ought to be.TPF62FPT  The interesting question is what 
                                                 
TP
61
PT Again, this conclusion assumes there are no “do overs” or “unwindings” of tax transactions.  For a 
discussion of the concept of unwindings, see David Hasen, Unwinding Unwinding (working paper).  If we 
allowed unwindings, once a taxpayer made an investment in reliance on uncertain tax law and that 
uncertainty is eventually resolved by the IRS or a court against the taxpayer (i.e., the court says the 
taxpayer’s position is wrong and he owes more taxes), the taxpayer would be permitted to say “never 
mind…I didn’t want to do the deal in the first place.”  And the whole transaction would be reversed.  Of 
course, such a result would require the acquiescence of the other party to the transaction. 
TP
62
PT In that sense, a court’s interpretation of the tax laws is akin to a court’s interpretation of a contract 
between two parties:  If the court interprets the contract to mean that X owes Y another $100, then that’s 
what X owes Y.  There is no reasonable-interpretation exception to one’s contract obligations.   This 
conclusion does not deny, of course, that there can be settlements in which parties to uncertain contracts 
will compromise and split the difference, just as there can be settlements between the IRS and taxpayers 
when the law is uncertain. 
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about the penalty – the amount imposed on the taxpayer over and above the underpaid tax 
liability.  The analysis to this point has been focusing exclusively on the possibility of 
imposing such penalties on the basis of strict liability, which is a term and concept 
borrowed from tort law.  The obvious alternative to a strict liability approach to tax 
penalties is a fault-based approach.   
What would an idealized fault-based tax penalty regime under conditions of 
substantive legal uncertainty look like?  At the most general level, the basic idea of a 
fault-based tax penalty regime can be stated as follows:  If the IRS and the court 
determines that a taxpayer has, in effect, caused “harm” (by taking a tax position that 
turns out to have been wrong), whether or not the taxpayer will be required to pay a 
penalty – in addition to the back taxes plus interest that is by assumption owed – will 
depend on whether the taxpayer’s position was in some sense “reasonable.” TPF63FPT  What is a 
“reasonable” tax position under conditions of substantive tax law uncertainty is the 
interesting question.  As it turns out, it is also a surprisingly difficult question to answer, 
even as a conceptual matter.  That is to say, although it is simple enough to apply the torts 
concept of strict liability in the tax context (since strict liability is pretty much the same 
across all contexts – that is, the offending (or injuring) party is forced to pay the harm she 
causes plus some additional penalty in cases of detection uncertainty) – the same cannot 
be said of the negligence standard. 
There is in fact a negligence penalty in the income tax.TPF64FPT  And the definition of 
negligence in tax law owes an obvious debt to tort law.  The negligence penalty in tax is 
imposed for any tax underpayment resulting from the taxpayer’s lack of “due care” or her 
                                                 
TP
63
PT I.R.C. sec. 6662(b). 
TP
64
PT I.R.C. sec. 6662(b). 
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failure to do what “an ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances.” TPF65FPT  
Precisely what due care means in this context is not clear.  The Service has ruled that, to 
avoid this penalty, the taxpayer must take reasonable steps to determine what the law is 
and then comply with that reasonable understanding; however, they say very little about 
what constitutes reasonableness.  Of course, the same can be said of the due care standard 
in tort law, where what constitutes a failure of ordinary prudence will typically be 
determined after the fact by a judge or jury applying an ad hoc analysis that takes into 
account all of the relevant facts and circumstances.  Some conceptual clarity has been 
brought to the due care standard in torts, with the famous Learned Hand cost-benefit test, 
but even that presents conceptual difficulties.  The Learned Hand rule, announced in U .S. 
v. Carroll TowingU, says that a tort defendant will be found to have been negligent – that 
is, found to have violated the “due care” standard – if it can be shown that she failed to 
take some precaution that would have reduced expected accident costs by more than the 
cost of the additional precaution.  Under Hand’s formulation, a party is negligence if the 
burden of avoiding the accident (B) was less than the product of the probability of the 
accident (P) and the potential liability resulting from the harm (L), and the party failed to 
undertake B.  Although the Learned Hand standard has been influential among courts and 
commentators on tort law, it has also generated considerable controversy.  For example, 
some argue that the information that the Learned Hand standard requires is not available 
to the factfinders who are asked to do the analysis.  I will make a similar argument about 
applying a Learned Hand type standard in the tax penalty context. 
                                                 
TP
65
PT Cite Neely case.  The negligence penalty is separate from the substantial understatement penalty.  That is, 
one can take an uncertain tax position that turns out to be wrong but is reasonable (non-negligent), thus 
avoiding the negligence penalty, but still have to pay the substantial understatement penalty. 
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But before we get to that criticism, what would a Learned Hand test even look 
like in the tax context?  One possible approach to a Learned Hand type test for penalties – 
though, as discussed more fully below, not the approach used in Code – would be to 
apply a version of the optimal merits probability threshold developed in previous Parts of 
this Article.  To see how this would work, imagine that the taxpayer has taken a particular 
tax position on her return, the position has been scrutinized by the Service, and the 
position has been found wanting. That is, the Service and the court have determined that 
the taxpayer is not in fact entitled to the deduction or credit she claimed, or must include 
some item of income that she excluded, and thus that back taxes and interest are owed.  
The Service/court would then ask whether the particular tax position in question ex ante 
(at the time the return was filed) had a probability of success on the merits in excess of 
the optimal merits probability threshold for that particular position, taking into account 
the expected pre-tax profit and the potential tax consequences for that particular 
transaction.  If so, the taxpayer’s position would be considered reasonable, or non-
negligent, and no penalties would be assessed.  If, however, the ex post adjudicator 
determined that the tax position in question was ex ante below the optimal merits 
probability threshold for that transaction, the taxpayer would be required pay the penalty.  
In other words, the taxpayer would in that case have taken an unreasonable tax position.TPF66FPT   
To get a sense of how this probabilistic fault-based standard might be applied, 
return to the Joe Taxpayer example, with $75 expected pre-tax profit, a potential tax 
                                                 
TP
66
PT This is of course not the only possible definition of taxpayer due care.  For example, due care might just 
mean that the tax payer has taken reasonable steps to figure out what the law means.  On this view, reliance 
on an expert’s advice might be sufficient to avoid penalties.  However, the question would remain whether 
to impose some minimal threshold of probability of success on the merits.  That is, surely reliance on legal 
advice would not excuse a clearly illegal position.  Moreover, allowing reliance on expert advice to avoid 
the negligence penalty would just push the penalty question back one step:  what should the standard of 
care be for the expert in advising a client to take a particular position. 
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liability of either $0 or $100, and a detection probability of 0.01.  Thus, for that 
transaction, the optimal merits probability threshold is 25 percent.  That is, it is socially 
cost-justified for Joe to make the investment if the likelihood of success on the merits is 
equal to or greater than 25 percent, but not otherwise.  Now imagine that Joe, after doing 
the requisite legal research (or having his lawyer do it), learns that the particular 
transaction has a 40 percent chance of prevailing if detected, and he makes the 
investment.  However, he happens to get selected for audit and, darn the luck, ultimately 
loses the case.  That means the court says Joe owes another $100 of tax, which he does 
(as we are assuming that the courts are never wrong).  But does he owe a penalty as well?  
Not according to our fault standard.  Joe made a reasonable (by which I mean, socially 
cost-justified) bet on the law under the circumstances, the same choice he would have 
made if detection had been certain and the penalty equal to the harm.  Therefore, under 
this theoretical tax-penalty standard, Joe would owe no penalty.  If, however, the 
probability of success on the merits for the transaction had been, say, 22 percent, and he 
had made the investment and, again, gotten caught and lost the case, he would have been 
required to pay the punitive penalty as well – the additional $9,900.  (Deterrence theory 
tells us that the punitive penalty should be calculated according to the Bentham-Becker 
formula, even for a fault-based regime.)  With such a probabilistic fault-based penalty in 
place, taxpayers would, under current assumptions, be deterred from taking unreasonably 
aggressive tax positions under circumstances in which the law is uncertain.  This result is 
analogous to the conclusion reached in the economic analysis of the negligence rule in 
torts.TPF67FPT 
                                                 
TP
67
PT According to that analysis, assuming a world similar to the one I have been assuming in this Article (i.e., 
perfectly rational actors, no judicial errors, etc.), a negligence standard set at the efficient level of care (that 
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B.  The Problems with a Probabilistic Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime 
Some of the problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax penalty regime are 
similar to the problems with a fault-based tort regime; some are unique to the tax context.  
This section discusses those problems.  Section __ below, however, resurrects the case 
for a modified version of the fault-based standard. 
So what’s wrong with the above-described idealized form of a fault-based tax 
penalty regime?  The most obvious concern, and ultimately perhaps the most troubling, is 
the problem of administrability.  How is the IRS or a court, looking at a tax position that 
it has decided lacks merit, supposed to determine the ex ante optimal merits probability 
threshold for that particular transaction?TPF68FPT  We have thus far assumed that courts get 
everything exactly right when they resolve the tax law uncertainty ex post, but to expect a 
court to do this analysis seems excessively optimistic.  And the problem seems more 
challenging than the problem (discussed earlier) of determining the ex ante probability of 
detection for the purpose of calculating the appropriate punitive penalty, which again 
would be required under both the strict liability and fault-based approaches.  In assessing 
ex ante probabilities of detection, at least the court can rely initially on concrete 
information that is in the hands of the government – i.e., audit rates – as a starting point 
for the analysis.  With the probabilistic fault analysis, however, the ex post adjudicator 
must determine what the optimal merits probability threshold for this tax transaction is, 
or, more precisely, what that probability was at the time the transaction was entered into.  
                                                                                                                                                 
is, the so-called “due care” standard) would induce potential tortfeasors ex ante to take all reasonable (i.e., 
cost-justified) steps to minimize the incidence and severity of accidents.  The seminal article explaining 
how a negligence standard in tort can induce optimal levels of “care” is Brown.  Shavell, supra note ___, 
ch. 4 (“Factors Bearing on the Determination of Negligence”); and William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law ch. 3 (“Strict Liability versus Negligence”). 
 
TP
68
PT Such information cost objections to fault-based liability regimes are commonplace in the economic 
literature on deterrence.  Shavell, supra note __; Landes & Posner, supra note __; Polinksy, supra note ___. 
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Which means figuring out what the expected pre-tax profit from the deal was expected to 
be and what the potential tax consequences would have been, as well as making an ex 
post assessment of the ex ante likelihood that the taxpayer would ultimately (ex post) 
succeed on the merits.  As difficult as this last element of the fault-standard sounds 
(determining the ex ante probability of success on the merits), it is in fact what the IRS 
and courts today are asked to do when applying the various understatement penalties 
under existing law.  That is, in cases in which a taxpayer’s reporting position is 
challenged and ultimately overturned by a court, the penalty phase of the analysis 
requires the court to make an ex post guess of the ex ante strength or weakness of the 
taxpayer’s legal position (literally cast in terms of probability of success on the merits).TPF69FPT 
Even if a fault-based approach to tax penalties could be made administrable (more 
on this below), it still may not be superior to the strict liability tax-penalty regime, at least 
if we continue with our present assumptions.  Both types of penalty regimes, by 
assumption, would entail the ex post analysis of the probability of detection, in order to 
set the proper Bentham-Becker penalty.  However, only the fault-based approach would 
also require a second costly application of the appropriate merits probability threshold.   
One possible response to this observation is that, if we return to the standard deterrence 
assumptions (perfect rationality, no judicial error, etc.), a fault-based approach might be 
superior because, for game-theoretic reasons, the penalty would never actually have to be 
imposed.  The reason is simple:  given the potential liability that the taxpayers face, and 
given the all-or-nothing nature of the fault standard (that is, if you satisfy it, you avoid all 
of the penalty – all $10,000 in our example), taxpayers would have an incentive to be at 
                                                 
TP
69
PT  Those penalties, again, are usually 20 percent of the underpaid tax, and sometimes, though rarely, as 
high as 75 percent.  See supra note __ (discussing existing tax penalty regime). 
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least efficiently conservative, in the sense of only making investments with merits 
probabilities greater than the efficient threshold that the Service would apply to their 
conduct.  As a result, again for game-theoretic reasons, all taxpayers would have an 
incentive to satisfy the fault standard, and hence in theory there would be no need for the 
penalty to be imposed.  To put this point differently, under a fault-based tax penalty 
regime, taxpayers who are taking advantage of uncertain tax rules can, in effect, insure 
themselves against the risk of a large tax penalty (should the uncertainty be resolved 
against them) by taking only reasonable tax positions, only positions that fall within the 
relevant merits probability threshold.  Assuming that courts never make mistakes in their 
ex post penalty assessments, and taxpayers never make mistakes in calculating the 
relevant ex ante merits probability threshold, the decision only to take reasonable tax 
positions would be (almost) equivalent to the purchase of tax risk insurance.  The result is 
an increase in social welfare, as risk-averse taxpayers would bear less risk.TPF70FPT   
Interestingly, in the general economic deterrence literature, this observation – the fault-
based system’s ability to reduce risk-bearing because the sanction is never used – is sited 
as an independent reason, though not necessarily an overwhelming reason, to prefer the 
fault-based approach over the strict liability approach. TPF71FPT 
Beyond the administrative costs arguments already discussed, there are two 
fundamental problems with the use of a fault-based tax-penalty standard.  The first – the 
activity-level problem – is well known in the deterrence literature and applies to the use 
                                                 
TP
70
PT Of course, once we allow the possibility of legal errors on the part of the taxpayer or the courts, risk-
bearing and the demand for insurance returns.  Below I explain why the reasonable-tax-position safe harbor 
is importantly different from the purchase tax liability insurance. 
TP
71
PT Polinsky & Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, supra note __, at __.    
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of a fault-based standard in any context.TPF72FPT  The second – which for lack of a better term I 
will call the distributional problem – has not previously been discussed and applies only 
to the use of a fault-based standard in the context of tax penalties.   
The activity-level problem is straightforward:  To the extent that taxpayers 
comply with the fault standard, and again assuming courts always get it right, taxpayers 
can be sure that they will not face a tax penalty.  This fact, as mentioned above, reduces 
the risk that they bear.  It also means, however, that they are not forced to internalize the 
cost of those tax positions that happen to turn out to be wrong – wrong but reasonable.  
As a result, they will have an incentive to engage in the activity beyond the point at 
which it is socially cost-justified for them to do so.  We can see this point in the example 
from above.  The taxpayer is considering a transaction with an expected pre-tax profit of 
$75 and a 60 percent chance of a causing a $100 tax liability.  Under a strict liability 
approach, he would face an expected tax liability of $60, either because of the expected 
ex post fine or because of the ex ante insurance premium.  Therefore, the taxpayer would 
make the investment so long as the $15 profit from the deal were superior to whatever 
after-tax profit he could get from some alternative use of the investment, but not 
otherwise.  With the fault-based approach, however, assuming the merits probability is at 
least greater than 25 percent, the taxpayer’s expected after-tax profit from making the 
investment would be $75.  Thus, he would engage in the transaction so long as there were 
no other similar investment that produced more than a $75 after-tax profit.  In sum, the 
taxpayer would be induced to engage in the questionable transaction even when it is not 
socially cost justified.  (For example, he would invest in this transaction even if there 
were another transaction with an expected after-tax profit of, say, $70.)  More generally, 
                                                 
TP
72
PT Shavell, supra note __, at __. 
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with a fault-based tax penalty regime, there would be an incentive to over-invest, or 
invest too often, in legally uncertain tax transactions.  This problem does not exist with 
strict liability, where the taxpayers are forced to internalize the expected tax liability 
associated with their investments.  The relative superiority of strict liability over fault-
based standards in dealing with activity-level issues on the part of “potential injurers” is 
well established in the deterrence literature, and the same arguments would seem apply in 
virtually any deterrence context.TPF73FPT 
The distributional problem with a fault-based tax penalty seems to apply uniquely, 
or at least especially, to the tax context.  (And as far as I know, it has never been noticed 
before.)  The problem arises insofar as the fault-based penalty eliminates or reduces the 
actual imposition of the tax penalties.  Recall the observation above that, under ideal 
circumstances, taxpayers are induced to satisfy whatever threshold of reasonableness is 
set for them by the courts such that no penalties are assessed.  Again, in non-tax areas, 
this fact is cited as one of the advantages of a fault-based standard, because it means there 
is no risk-bearing.  The difficulty is that, in the tax area, there is a distributional reason 
                                                 
TP
73
PT Id.  A classic example in the torts context illustrating the distinction between care levels and activity 
levels, and how these variables come out differently under negligence and strict liability, involves driver-
pedestrian accidents.  Under both a strict liability rule and an idealized negligence rule, drivers will have an 
incentive to take optimal care when they drive.  However, under a negligence rule, drivers will drive too 
often (or beyond the point at which the next mile driven produces marginal social cost in excess of 
marginal social benefit), because they will be immune from liability for “unpreventable” accidents.  Under 
a strict liability rule, by contrast, drivers would bear the cost of unpreventable accidents and thus would be 
induced to take into account those costs when deciding how often or how much to drive.  Polinsky, supra 
note __, at __.   If we assume further that only drivers (and not pedestrians) can affect the probability or 
severity of accidents (that is, we assume driver-pedestrian accidents are “unilateral accidents”), then the 
above analysis suggests that strict liability would be the more efficient liability rule, because it can optimize 
both care levels and activity levels of potential injurers.  If we assume, however, that pedestrians can affect 
the expected accident costs as well, through care-level investments or changes in their activity levels, then 
the story gets more complicated.  I am assuming for now that the choice of a tax liability rule can only 
affect the behavior of taxpayers (the potential injurers here) and not Congress or Treasury (acting on behalf 
of the “injured” fisc).  
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that we want the penalties to be imposed.  The failure to impose the penalties actually 
reduces social welfare, and for distributional reasons, not deterrence reasons.   
The best way to illustrate this point is by example.  Consider our recurring 
hypothetical, the one with the 100,000 taxpayers all engaging in a tax transaction with a 
60 percent chance of producing a $100 tax liability, and hence the expected tax liability 
of $60 per taxpayer.  Hence, the transaction has 40 percent chance of winning on the 
merits. Under the fault-based standard described above, all of the 100,000 taxpayers 
would have engaged in this hypothetical transaction because the 40 percent chance of 
prevailing on the merits would be deemed a “reasonable” position by a court.  This is 
because the 40 percent merits probability surpasses the optimal merits probability 
threshold for this transaction (which, recall, was 25 percent).  According to the 
assumptions of the example, then, 1000 of those taxpayers would be audited, and 600 of 
those would lose their cases on the merits.  For those 600 taxpayers, then, the fault-based 
penalty analysis would be applied, and the court would inquire as to the reasonableness 
of the position taken.  As noted, the answer would be yes, the position was reasonable.  
Thus, none of taxpayers would be assessed a penalty.  Which means that the total amount 
of tax revenue collected from these taxpayers for this transaction would be $60,000 – 
$100 of taxes multiplied by 600, the number of taxpayers who were audited and lost their 
cases.  So what’s wrong with this picture? 
The problem is that, in terms of probabilistic distributive justice, $60,000 is 
approximately $5.94 million too little to be taxing this group of 100,000 taxpayers who 
are engaging in a series of transactions that almost certainty are collectively producing an 
income tax liability of $6 million.  That is to say, if it were feasible and cost-justified to 
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audit all 100,000 taxpayers who engaged in this transaction, approximately 60,000 of the 
taxpayers would be found to owe $100, and the other 40,000 taxpayers, nothing.  That is 
what we meant above when we assumed that the 100,000 transactions in question had a 
40 percent chance of prevailing on the merits.  Of course, auditing all 100,000 taxpayers 
is by assumption not feasible.  The question therefore is what the tax system can do, in 
terms of allocating the tax burden consistent with society’s distributional values or 
preferences.  The answer may be somewhat surprising:  Given that every one of the 
100,000 taxpayers engaged in a tax transaction that created an expected tax liability of 
$60, the best the income tax system can do might be to collect something close to $6 
million from the group, getting $60 from each of the 100,000, since they are all equal in 
the eyes of the law with regard to these transactions.  That is, as among the 100,000, the 
principle of horizontal equity would suggest that each should pay $60 in income taxes for 
engaging in the transaction in question. TPF74FPT  And because a fault-based standard can, for 
game-theoretic reasons, result in the imposition of no penalties (again, assuming all 
taxpayers rationally decide to comply with the standard), only the strict liability tax-
penalty system (which imposes the penalty on the few audited taxpayers found to owe 
taxes) would achieve this distributively desirable result.  That is, only the strict liability 
                                                 
TP
74
PT The following is a summary of the possible distributive combinations associated with the strict-liability 
and fault-based approach to tax penalties, using the example in the text.  It assumes that a Bentham-Becker 
penalty regime is in place, but that no penalties are assessed under a fault-based regime, since all taxpayer 
are induced to meet the threshold standard of reasonableness:  1)  the fault-based approach (with no 
insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $100 each; everyone else – the 400 who are 
audited and win and the 999,000 who are not audited – pays nothing, for a total of $60,000 in taxes 
collected from this group (the other $5,940,000 would come from other taxpayers); 2) the strict liability 
approach (without insurance): the 600 taxpayers who are audited and lose pay $10,000 each; the 400 who 
are audited and win, and the 999,000 who were not audited, pay nothing, for a total of $6 million; 3) the 
strict liability approach (with insurance): each of the 100,000 who engages in the transaction pays $60, for 
a total of $6 million, which gets paid by insurer when 600 taxpayer/insureds are required to pay $10,000 
each; and finally 4) changing the example to allow for a detection probability of one, 100,000 taxpayers get 
audited and 60,000 are required to pay $100 in back taxes each (no penalty in that case is necessary), for  
total of $6 million. 
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tax-penalty regime forces taxpayers who make investments in reliance on uncertain 
(sometimes very uncertain) tax positions to bear the expected income tax liabilities 
associated with those positions.TPF75FPT 
Note how this result differs from the result in a non-tax area of law, such as torts, 
where we do not usually think of the law as being explicitly distributive in nature.  If we 
imagine tort law being primarily about deterring accidents, rather than about trying to 
achieve a particular distribution of income, we do not care whether the penalties ever get 
imposed.  So long as, say, drivers are encouraged to drive carefully or manufacturers are 
induced to make safe products, there is no independent reason to require the payment of 
fines or damages.  The victims of accidents caused by reasonably safe driving or 
reasonably safe products can be compensated much more efficiently through their own 
first-party insurance companies than through penalties assessed by the government.  But 
tax law is different, or at least that is the conventional wisdom.TPF76FPT  Tax law, at least the 
income tax, is primarily about (a) raising revenue to spend on public goods and (b) 
allocating the tax burdens in a manner consistent with our society’s vision of distributive 
fairness, whatever that vision happens to be.  Hence, when Congress decides that the tax 
system should collect X dollars from taxpayers who meet a particular description, 
taxpayers who satisfy certain criteria set out in the law, then failing to collect the tax from 
                                                 
TP
75
PT Whether one believes that the strict tax liability approach, plus the Bentham-Becker penalty, must be 
accompanied by tax liability insurance to achieve these distributive justice superiority over the fault-based 
approach will depend largely on whether one is an ex ante or ex post egalitarian.  That is, if you think that 
fairness requires only that each of the 100,000 taxpayers in my example be treated equally only with 
respect to their ex ante choice, and not the ex post outcomes, then the insurance is not necessary.  Each of 
the 100,000 had the chance to decline to engage in the risky tax position, and if they eventually experience 
the large Bentham-Becker penalty, that is a function of pure option luck.  Again that result assumes 
perfectly informed voluntary decisionmaking on the part of the taxpayers, which may approximate the real 
world in cases involving sophisticated taxpayers. 
TP
76
PT For an argument that other areas of law besides tax might also be understood as having a distributive 
component, see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance, 56 Tax L. Rev. 203 (2003). 
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those individuals means we have to raise the money some other way, such as increasing 
the national debt or raising rates on everyone.  The problem is that either of these latter 
options produces a distributive result that is different from what Congress intended, 
different from the social optimum.  And these divergences from the optimal distributive 
outcome represent losses of social welfare to the same extent as do distortions of labor 
choices caused by various tax rules.TPF77FPT   
In sum, the main problems with a probabilistic fault-based tax penalty regime are 
that such a regime (a) is relatively difficult to administer, (b) owing to the activity-level 
effect, may result in far too many uncertain (albeit “reasonably uncertain”) tax positions 
being taken, and (c) fails to allocate the tax liabilities associated with those legally 
uncertain transactions to the group of taxpayers who engaged in them.  In its idealized 
form, the strict liability tax penalty regime – with the Bentham-Becker penalty, 
accompanied by a tax transaction insurance regime (which could somehow deal with the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems) – is able to avoid or at least minimize these 
problems.  That result, however, depends on several key assumptions.  It should come as 
no surprise, therefore, that the best case for using a fault-based tax-penalty builds on the 
inapplicability of these assumptions in the real world. 
C.  The Best Case for a Fault-Based Tax Penalty Regime   
As mentioned above, and as every tax practitioner knows, the tax-penalty regime 
currently in effect for the U.S. income tax is a combination of (a) strict liability with 
respect to back taxes and interest and (b) a fault-based system of sorts for penalties.  But 
what sort of fault-based penalty is it?  In fact, as mentioned above, there are several tax 
                                                 
TP
77
PT Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income 
Tax, 49 Nat. Tax J. 1035 (1996). 
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penalties, all of which require some showing of fault on the part of the taxpayer.  There 
are penalties for tax fraud, where the taxpayer knowingly and intentionally violates a 
clear tax law. TPF78FPT  Again, those penalties do not involve situations of substantive legal 
uncertainty.  Then there is the negligence penalty, where the taxpayer is penalized for 
failing to do what a reasonable taxpayer would do under the circumstances.  Again, it is 
unclear what would qualify as reasonable in this setting, but the Service has said that it 
amounts to the sort of mistake that the average taxpayer might make, assuming she has 
made reasonable efforts to inform herself of the law (whatever that means).  Interestingly, 
the Service has further defined reasonable care to include any tax position that has at least 
a “reasonable basis” in the law.TPF79FPT  Recall that the reasonable basis standard – which is 
more stringent than non-frivolous and less stringent that substantial authority – is 
sometimes quantified as approximating 20 percent likelihood of winning on the merits.   
There is also the substantial understatement penalty, which would apply instead of the 
negligence penalty to large tax understatements and which has a more stringent fault-
based standard:  that is, the taxpayer must have more than a reasonable basis; she must 
have substantial authority for the questionable position.  Here the safe harbor or target 
level of threshold probability is closer to 40 percent.  And under current law, this target 
threshold probability of legal certainty rises (to 50 percent) for certain categories of tax 
positions, such as so-called “reportable transactions,” that are considered somewhat more 
questionable because of their nature.   
What all of the current fault-based tax penalties have in common, then, are their 
reliance on targeted threshold merits probabilities.  How might such penalty regime be 
                                                 
TP
78
PT I.R.C. sec. 6663. 
TP
79
PT Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(1). 
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justified, given the analysis above that seems to favor a strict liability penalty regime?  
Let’s begin by recognizing that a full-fledged Bentham-Becker penalty regime across the 
board to all taxpayers is unrealistic.  This is so both because of the ex post unfairness and 
judgment proof problems of imposing large punitive penalties on the few taxpayers 
whose tax positions are rejected on audit and because of the imperfections in the tax 
transaction insurance response.  Although it is an interesting theoretical possibility, 
Congress will never in fact adopt a tax penalty regime that would impose a $9,900 
penalty for a tax underpayment of $100.  Given this fact, we are probably limited to tax 
penalties that are far lower than the Bentham-Becker ideal, though it is difficult to deny 
that the normal penalty should be greater than the current 20 percent of the tax 
underpayments. 
If for practical or political reasons we are unlikely ever to have tax penalties that 
approximate the Bentham-Becker ideal, a reasonably strong argument can be made for 
using a fault-based approach, of the sort that creates target thresholds of legal certainty.  
The gist of the idea is simple:  If we cannot adopt a regime that would in effect induce 
taxpayers themselves to identify the optimal merits probability threshold for a given 
transaction and to make optimal decisions at the margins regarding whether to rely on a 
particular uncertain tax interpretation or not (which again is what the idealized strict 
liability regime would do), we should instead choose some arbitrary merits probability 
threshold – some minimally acceptable target level of legal certainty – and then, through 
the use of penalties, try to induce everyone at least to meet that standard.   Such an all-or-
nothing penalty would have the effect of creating relatively strong incentives for taxpayer 
compliance at least to the extent of the target threshold level of certainty.  This is because 
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the taxpayer by satisfying the targeted threshold level of legal certainty can avoid all 
penalties; whereas, if she fails to satisfy it and gets caught, she owes the full penalty. This 
all-or-nothing effect would be especially strong for taxpayers who are risk averse with 
respect to large tax penalties and there is some uncertainty as to the actual application of 
the standard by the IRS and the courts.  
Does this mean that current law has chosen the optimal target thresholds of legal 
certainty to serve as triggers for the various penalties?  That is, are reasonable basis, 
realistic possibility of success, substantial authority, and more likely than not the right 
thresholds?  And does the law assign the right legal certainty target for the right types of 
transactions?  That is impossible to say.  My own instinct would be, in addition to 
increasing the magnitude of penalties, it would be useful to increase the threshold target 
level of certainty for all fault-based penalties to more likely than not, but that is just an 
instinct.  The alternative would be to keep the general shape of the current penalty 
regime, which imposes a higher certainty threshold for (a) uncertain tax positions that are 
not disclosed to the service (and hence that have a lower probability of detection) and (b) 
tax positions that are similar in structure to positions that are known to be especially 
aggressive, but perhaps to raise the level of certainty required for any type of tax position 
to avoid penalties.  
 
 
Conclusion 
No matter how hard Congress and the Treasury Department try to specify the 
precise tax treatment of every conceivable situation, it can’t be done.  There will always 
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be gaps in the tax laws.  Given this fact, what tax penalty regime will induce taxpayers to 
make the right choice regarding whether, and under what conditions, to rely on a 
particular uncertain interpretation of the law?  This question is made much more 
interesting, and problematic, because of a second type of legal uncertainty – that is, 
detection uncertainty, or the uncertainty as to whether a particular tax position will even 
be questioned by the enforcement authorities.  The combination of these two types of 
legal uncertainty creates a serious tax enforcement problem. 
This Article observes that there is no a priori “right” level of legal certainty that a 
taxpayer must have before relying on a particular interpretation of uncertain tax laws.  
Rather, the optimal threshold of substantive legal certainty will depend on the case, 
specifically on the amount of taxes at stake and the expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction in question.  The Article contends that, applying the standard assumptions 
from the economic literature on deterrence, the optimal tax penalty regime would involve 
(a) a rule of strict liability with respect to taxes owed as well as the penalty, and (b) and 
penalty calculated on the basis of the famous Bentham-Becker formula, which divides the 
harm (here, the underpaid tax) by the probability of detection.  Such a rule would induce 
taxpayers to make the optimal ex ante decisions regarding when, and to what extent, to 
rely on particular interpretations of uncertain tax laws.  The Article also explains why, 
under these same assumptions, a fault-based approach to tax compliance penalties would 
not work as well, owing to the fault-based approach’s comparatively high administrative 
costs, its inability to regulate activity levels, and its relatively unattractive distributional 
consequences (especially if either private or government-provided tax transaction 
insurance for substantively uncertain positions is allowed and available).  
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All of these conclusions are based on some pretty strong assumptions.  Some of 
the assumptions, although obviously unrealistic (such as the perfectly rational taxpayer 
assumption and the infallible IRS/court assumption), do not tend to favor one penalty 
regime over another.  Others, however, may actually affect the comparison.  For example, 
if it simply is not possible, for political or other reasons, to impose large punitive 
penalties that approximate those suggested by the Bentham-Becker model, then it is not 
clear that a strict liability regime is superior to a fault-based regime.  In that case, a fault 
approach, with an arbitrarily chosen – and somewhat high – targeted merits probability 
threshold might induce a higher level of tax compliance than would a strict liability rule, 
especially if taxpayers are risk averse (and not allowed to insure) and hence would have a 
tendency to over-comply with the uncertain standard.TPF80FPT  Also, if we allow for the 
possibility of informal sanctions, such as social norms against tax non-compliance, which 
we have been assuming away, it might be that lower formal penalties would lead to 
higher informal penalties; and the combination might provide greater overall deterrence 
than the imposition of a true Bentham-Becker penalty regime. TPF81FPT 
Besides the fact that 20- and 30-percent underpayment penalties are probably too 
low to get the ex ante compliance incentives right, this Article takes no ultimate position 
on which tax penalty regime is best.  My goal in this Article, rather, has been to set forth 
a framework for analyzing this question.  My own tentative view is that a fault-based tax-
penalty standard might work best with most individual taxpayers, but that with corporate 
                                                 
TP
80
PT See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984). 
TP
81
PT This might be true, for example, if it turned out that formal tax penalties, such as those provided in the 
Code and enforced by the IRS, had the effect of “crowding out” more informal sanctions for tax 
noncompliance.  Of course, formal and informal penalties do not necessarily have to interact as substitutes; 
they could also be complements, in which case cutting formal penalties may send the wrong message and 
actually encourage noncompliance. 
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taxpayers (and perhaps some wealthy individual taxpayers) a strict liability approach with 
something approaching Bentham-Becker penalties – and private or government-provided 
tax transaction insurance – might be worth trying.  The other interesting question raised 
by this Article’s analysis is whether the same questions are raised – such as the question 
of the optimal merits probability threshold – and the same framework could be applied to 
any area of law in which the substantive legal standards and rules are uncertain.  That 
question must await another article. 
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